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THE “TUNISIAN” SPRING: WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN TUNISIA 
AND BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR FEMINISM IN 
NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
John Hursh* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
More than six years have passed since the tumultuous weeks that 
comprised the key moments of the Arab Spring.1  Although initially 
greeted with great optimism, most results of these remarkable events 
ultimately have been discouraging.2  In Egypt, a “democratic coup 
 
* LL.M., McGill University Faculty of Law; J.D., Indiana University Maurer School 
of Law.  I would like to thank the University of Baltimore School of Law and the 
Center on Applied Feminism for inviting me to its outstanding Feminist Legal 
Theory Conference in 2016.  I would also like to thank all the students and staff at 
the University of Baltimore Law Review for greatly improving this article since its 
initial submission.  Special thanks goes to Managing Editor Emily Steiner for truly 
exceptional editing and to Articles Editor Stanley Carignan for deftly moving this 
article through the production process and for his great patience with the author.  
Finally, I dedicate this article to all the brave feminists and activists that continue to 
fight for gender equality throughout the world.  Salam. 
1. See Lin Noueihed, Peddler’s Martyrdom Launched Tunisia’s Revolution, REUTERS 
(Jan. 19, 2011, 11:29 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-tunisia-protests-bouazizi-
idUKTRE70I7TV20110119.  Most accounts of the Arab Spring mark December 17, 
2010 as the starting point, when local protestors gathered in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia 
following Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation.  See id. (“It began with a slap and 
an insult hurled at a vegetable seller in a small town surrounded by scrub and cactus.  
It ended with a revolution that has shaken authoritarian leaders across the Arab 
world.”).  Bouazizi, a fruit seller, committed this act after a humiliating encounter 
with local authorities that encapsulated the feeling of helplessness that many 
Tunisians, particularly the marginalized youth, felt during President Ben Ali’s 
corrupt and repressive rule.  See id.  This feeling resonated throughout much of the 
Arab world, where protesters, often led by frustrated youth, rebelled against 
similarly corrupt and authoritarian regimes.  See, e.g., Kareem Fahim, Slap to a 
Man’s Pride Set Off Tumult in Tunisia, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/world/africa/22sidi.html (“The revolution has 
rippled beyond Tunisia, shaking other authoritarian Arab states, whose frustrated 
young people are often written off as complacent when faced with stifling 
bureaucracy and an impenetrable and intimidating security apparatus.”).   
2. See, e.g., Robin Yassin-Kassab et al., ‘I Was Terribly Wrong’ - Writers Look Back at 
the Arab Spring Five Years on, GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2016, 2:30 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/jan/23/arab-spring-five-years-on-writers-
look-back (demonstrating the contrast between Arab writers’ initial positive 
reactions to the Arab Spring and their reactions five years later). 
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d’état” paved the way for the resignation of longtime authoritarian 
leader Hosni Mubarak and, eventually, democratic elections.3  
However, this moment of hope and reform proved to be short-lived.  
The elected president and Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed 
Morsi proved to be so divisive and consolidated executive authority 
to such an alarming extent that General Abdel Sisi replaced him in a 
military, if arguably popularly supported, coup.4  Egypt is now 
perhaps even more authoritarian and less free than it was under 
President Mubarak,5 and as President Sisi’s popularity continues to 
wane, many commentators argue that Egypt’s “deep state” remains in 
control of the country despite the 2011 revolution or 2013 coup.6  
Likewise, little has changed in Morocco, where after widespread 
protests and a promising youth-led grassroots initiative (the February 
20th Movement),7 the majority of Moroccans eventually stood pat 
 
3. See Ozan O. Varol, The Democratic Coup d’État, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 291, 356 
(2012). 
4. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps Down, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html (detailing 
President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation); David D. Kirkpatrick, Named Egypt’s 
Winner, Islamist Makes History, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/world/middleeast/mohamed-morsi-of-muslim-
brotherhood-declared-as-egypts-president.html (assessing Mohamed Morsi’s 
successful presidential campaign in 2012); Sisi Takes Power in Egypt, AL JAZEERA 
(June 8, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/sisi-be-sworn-
as-egypt-president-20146843619902534.html (discussing General Sisi’s assumption 
of power after deposing President Morsi). 
5. Worse than Mubarak, ECONOMIST (May 2, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21650160-abdel-fattah-al-
sisi-has-restored-order-egypt-great-cost-worse (“But [Sisi’s] authoritarian habits 
leave Egypt looking a lot as it did before the Arab spring, when Mr. Mubarak, 
another military man, ruled with an iron first.  The repression is even worse now, say 
many.”). 
6. Heba Saleh, Sisi Loses His Lustre as Discontent Grows in Egypt, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 
21, 2016, 1:46 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5528ce9e-0799-11e6-9b51-
0fb5e65703ce.html#axzz4ErqGlfnu (statement of Osama al-Ghazali Harb, 
Democratic Front Party) (“Sisi has become less popular with time because it has 
been demonstrated that those who really rule in Egypt now are the agencies of the 
deep state—security organs and the bureaucracy.”). 
7. Adria Lawrence, The Mixed Record of Morocco’s February 20 Protest Movement, 
WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Feb. 20, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/20/the-mixed-
record-of-moroccos-february-20-protest-movement/ (“The biggest winner of the 
Moroccan Arab Spring was the monarchy itself . . . . The February 20th movement’s 
objective—a monarch constrained by democratic procedures—has not been 
achieved.  Instead, the king paid lip service to democratic aspirations while quietly 
shutting down critical voices.”); Ilhem Rachidi, Inside the Movement: What Is Left of 
Morocco’s February 20?, MIDDLE EAST EYE (Feb. 26, 2015, 6:32 PM), 
http://www.middleeasteye.net/in-depth/features/what-left-morocco-s-february-20-
 
2017 The “Tunisian” Spring 279 
 
when King Mohammed VI made largely superficial democratic 
reforms.8 
Perhaps most distressing, violence has increased significantly.9  
After the removal of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya remains a violent 
state with two parallel governments.10  Yemen also remains ensnarled 
in violence, which escalated significantly in 2015 due to Saudi 
Arabia’s intervention, turning an already protracted internal conflict 
into a regional one.11  Finally, the civil war in Syria continues to 
 
movement-857852436 (“[D]espite constitutional reforms announced in the aftermath 
of the first 2011 protests and hailed by the international community, most activists 
say they feel no real political progress has been made.”). 
8. Marina Ottaway, The New Moroccan Constitution: Real Change or More of the 
Same?, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (June 20, 2011), 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/20/new-moroccan-constitution-real-change-
or-more-of-same-pub-44731 (“A large number of interviews during a recent trip to 
Morocco suggest that the king may well have succeeded in staying ahead of the 
protest that has led to the demise of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and plunged 
Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain into turmoil and violence.”); see also Aidan 
Lewis, Why Has Morocco’s King Survived the Arab Spring?, BBC NEWS (Nov. 24, 
2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15856989 (explaining how the 
majority allowed King Mohammed VI to remain in power despite the protests and 
grassroots movements).  See generally MOHAMED DAADAOUI, MOROCCAN 
MONARCHY AND THE ISLAMIST CHALLENGE: MAINTAINING MAKHZEN POWER (2011) 
(providing a strong socio-institutional explanation for the monarchy’s ability to 
remain in power and withstand opposition through its appropriation and 
manipulation of traditional cultural and religious symbols and practices). 
9. See, e.g., Greg Botelho, Arab Spring Aftermath: Revolutions Give Way to Violence, 
More Unrest, CNN (Mar. 28, 2015, 1:52 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/27/middleeast/arab-spring-aftermath/.  In addition to 
violence and armed conflict, women and girls living within Arab countries have 
faced additional violence linked to the Arab Spring.  See RACHEL KEAN, 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY MEETING SUMMARY: THE RISE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN AND GIRLS SINCE THE ARAB SPRING 4 (2014), 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140
610RiseViolenceAgainstWomenArabSpring.pdf (noting that women and girls face 
new forms of violence “intrinsically linked to the political uprisings of the Arab 
Spring – women’s ‘bodies are battlefields’ and are being instrumentalized in political 
rivalries”). 
10. Leila Fadel, Libya Today: 2 Governments, Many Militias, Infinite Chaos, NPR (Feb. 
6, 2015, 1:49 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/02/06/384277648/libya-today-two-
governments-many-militias-infinite-chaos; see also Agence France-Presse, Libya 
Conflict: UN Says All Sides Probably Guilty of War Crimes, GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 
2016, 3:36 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/25/libya-conflict-un-
says-all-sides-are-probably-guilty-of-war-crimes (“All sides in the Libyan conflict 
are probably guilty of war crimes, including torturing, raping and executing 
prisoners . . . .”). 
11. Yemen: Crisis Overview, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR COORDINATION HUMANITARIAN 
AFF., http://www.unocha.org/yemen/crisis-overview (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) 
(noting that since the March 2015 escalation of an already protracted conflict, 
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show few signs of abetting.  The conflict already has claimed the 
lives of perhaps 400,000 people,12 led to an overwhelming refugee 
and migrant crisis,13 and provided fertile ground for the Islamic State 
to take root.14 
 
government and opposition forces had killed 6,500 people (an average of 113 
causalities per day) and injured more than 31,400, while an estimated 14.4 million 
people cannot meet their food needs and 7.6 million are “severely food insecure”); 
see also Laura Kasinof, How Yemen’s Civil Conflict Turned into a Regional Proxy 
War, NATION (May 4, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-yemens-civil-
conflict-turned-regional-proxy-war/ (“The conflict in Yemen is not rooted in a 
regional conflict. . . . [I]t has become a part of a bigger regional war that is not just 
about Yemen.”); Jim Michaels, Yemen Fighting Grows into Regional Conflict, USA 
TODAY (Mar. 26, 2015, 7:54 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/03/26/tikrity-shiite-iran-saudi-
arabia-yemen/70505808/ (“Sectarian fighting escalated dramatically in Yemen 
Thursday, as an unfolding civil war began to look more like a regional conflict 
between Sunni-led Saudi Arabia and Shiite power Iran.”); Yemen: The Forgotten 
War, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/yemen-the-
forgotten-war/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (“On 25 March 2015, an international 
coalition led by Saudi Arabia launched air strikes against the Huthi armed 
group . . . . [T]he conflict has spread and fighting has engulfed the entire country.  
Horrific human rights abuses, as well as war crimes, are being committed throughout 
the country causing unbearable suffering for civilians.”). 
12. Syria Death Toll: UN Envoy Estimates 400,000 Killed, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 23, 2016), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/staffan-de-mistura-400000-killed-syria-
civil-war-160423055735629.html. 
13. Syria Regional Refugee Response, UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php (last updated Oct. 23, 2016) (noting 
that there are nearly 4.8 million registered Syrian refugees); see also Syria’s Refugee 
Crisis in Numbers, AMNESTY INT’L (Feb. 3, 2016, 7:02 PM), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/02/syrias-refugee-crisis-in-numbers/. 
14. See Philip Issa, Syrian Civil War: Five Ways the Conflict Has Changed the World, 
INDEPENDENT (Mar. 13, 2016, 3:44 PM), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syrian-civil-war-isis-how-it-
changed-the-world-refugee-crisis-a6928796.html (“It was in the vacuum of the 
deteriorating Syria conflict that a little-known and terrifically violent branch of al-
Qaeda grew into the foremost terror group on the planet.”); Loveday Morris, In 
Syrian Civil War, Emergence of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Boosts Rival Jabhat 
al-Nusra, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-syrian-civil-war-emergence-
of-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-syria-boosts-rival-jabhat-al-
nusra/2013/10/25/12250760-3b4b-11e3-b0e7-716179a2c2c7_story.html.  In 2016, 
Ennahda found that it had outgrown its Islamist origins and the party now identifies 
as “Muslim democrats.”  Rached Ghannouchi, From Political Islam to Muslim 
Democracy: The Ennahda Party and the Future of Tunisia, 95 FOREIGN AFF. 58, 58 
(2016).  Noting that Islamic values still guide the party’s actions, Ennahda no longer 
feels under threat from authoritarian dictators that previously denied its participation 
in the political process.  Id. at 59.  As such, Ennahda can function as a political party 
rather than as the social movement from which it began.  As Ghannouchi stated: 
“Tunisia is finally a democracy rather than a dictatorship; that means that Ennahda 
can finally be a political party focusing on its practical agenda and economic vision 
rather than a social movement fighting against repression and dictatorship.”  Id. at 
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In the midst of this authoritarianism, chaos, and bloodshed, Tunisia 
has emerged as a largely free and open society.15  Tunisia’s 
successful transition from authoritarian kleptocracy to democratic 
state received further validation when Tunisia’s National Dialogue 
Quartet received the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize.16  A crucial aspect of 
Tunisia’s transition from revolution to an emergent, if fragile, 
democracy was the success of women’s rights activists in shaping 
this process.  These activists worked tirelessly to ensure that 
women’s rights remained strong both through their participation in 
civil society and by safeguarding these rights in Tunisia’s legal 
system.17  Indeed, Tunisian feminists and women’s rights activists 
succeeded not only in joining the protests that forced President Zine 
al-Abidine Ben Ali to flee the country, but also in remaining an 
active part of civil society and the National Dialogue.18  Their most 
 
60.  Although a significant change worth noting, this Article discusses Ennahda 
through 2015, when the party still identified as an Islamist party. 
15. Sebastian Fagan, Tunisia Declared Free by Freedom House, TUNIS. LIVE (Feb. 11, 
2015), http://www.tunisia-live.net/2015/02/11/tunisia-declared-free-by-freedom-
house/ (“Tunisia was singled out as an example of a successful democracy in a 
region which has seen continuing state suppression and human rights abuses.”); Arch 
Puddington, Discarding Democracy: A Return to the Iron Fist, in FREEDOM HOUSE, 
FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2015 (2015), 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/01152015_FIW_2015_final.pdf 
(“Tunisia’s . . . status improved from Partly Free to Free due to the adoption of a 
progressive constitution, governance improvements under a consensus-based 
caretaker administration, and the holding of free and fair parliamentary and 
presidential elections, all with a high degree of transparency.”). 
16. Julian Borger et al., Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet Wins 2015 Nobel Peace 
Prize, GUARDIAN (Oct. 9, 2015, 11:04 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/09/tunisian-national-dialogue-quartet-
wins-2015-nobel-peace-prize; The Nobel Peace Prize for 2015, NOBELPRIZE.ORG 
(Oct. 10, 2015), 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2015/press.html. 
17. See UN Women Applauds the Decision to Award the Nobel Peace Prize to the 
Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, UN WOMEN (Oct. 9, 2015), 
http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2015/10/statement-on-nobel-peace-prize-
to-the-tunisian-national-dialogue-quartet (“[T]he remarkable strides in Tunisia’s 
democratic transition, including the adoption of the Constitution in 2014 . . . were 
due in large part to the extensive consultations with civil society including women 
from diverse backgrounds and segments of Tunisian society.”). 
18. Hayat Alvi, Women’s Rights Movements in the ‘Arab Spring’: Major Victories or 
Failures for Human Rights?, 16 J. INT’L WOMEN’S STUD. 294, 307 (2015) (“Women 
took part in the Tunisian revolution of 2011, and played significant roles in the 
activism that helped end decades of authoritarianism.”); Mounira M. Charrad & 
Amina Zarrugh, The Arab Spring and Women’s Rights in Tunisia, E-INT’L REL. 
(Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.e-ir.info/2013/09/04/the-arab-spring-and-womens-rights-
in-tunisia/ (“At the heart of this burgeoning civil society and activism following the 
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significant legal victory was including an article guaranteeing gender 
equality within Tunisia’s 2014 post-revolution constitution, despite 
initially strong opposition from conservative actors and reluctance 
from Ennahda, the Islamist party then controlling parliament.19  Just 
as importantly, women’s rights activists maintained their ability to 
participate in public discourse and the political process that shaped 
Tunisia’s mostly peaceful transition, as the country moved from 
authoritarian regime to a surprisingly inclusive democracy.20 
In this regard, Tunisia can be viewed as a state moving toward the 
gender inclusive society reflected in the canonical texts of Islamic 
feminism.21  Scholars such as Leila Ahmed, Fatima Mernissi, Amina 
Wadud, Asma Barlas, among many others, have long rejected that 
Islam is incompatible with women’s rights.22  Rather, they find that 
deep-seated patriarchal traditions have usurped the ethos of gender 
equality present within Islamic thought.23  At the same time, scholars 
such as Abdullahi An-Na‘im argue that a secular state is necessary 
for Islam,24 while contemporary writers such as Mona Eltahawy find 
that the Middle East requires a sexual revolution before women will 
find equality and escape patriarchy and oppression.25  The Tunisian 
 
Jasmine Revolution is the historical status of Tunisia as the bulwark of women’s 
rights in the region.”). 
19. See infra Section IV.B(3)(c)(ii). 
20. Alvi, supra note 18, at 305–06 (noting that “[i]n Tunisia, women freely occupy the 
public space” and that an August 2012 rally saw thousands protest against possible 
constitutional changes that would have threatened gender equality). 
21. See, e.g., Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Towards Gender Equality: Muslim Family Laws and 
the Shari‘ah, in WANTED: EQUALITY AND JUSTICE IN THE MUSLIM FAMILY 23, 42 
(Zainah Anwar ed., 2009); Ziba Mir-Hosseini, The Construction of Gender in 
Islamic Legal Thought and Strategies for Reform, 1 HAWWA: J. WOMEN MIDDLE E. 
& ISLAMIC WORLD 1, 4 (2003) (“The further fiqh texts are removed from the time 
and the spirit of revelation, the stronger becomes their patriarchal voice.”). 
22. See LEILA AHMED, WOMEN AND GENDER IN ISLAM: HISTORICAL ROOTS OF A MODERN 
DEBATE 11 (1992); FATIMA MERNISSI, BEYOND THE VEIL: MALE-FEMALE DYNAMICS 
IN MODERN MUSLIM SOCIETY 19 (Ind. Univ. Press rev. ed. 1987) (1975); FATIMA 
MERNISSI, THE VEIL AND THE MALE ELITE: A FEMINIST INTERPRETATION OF WOMEN’S 
RIGHTS IN ISLAM 10–11 (Mary Jo Lakeland trans., Addison-Wesley Publ’g Co. 1991) 
(1987); AMINA WADUD, INSIDE THE GENDER JIHAD: WOMEN’S REFORM IN ISLAM 2 
(2006); AMINA WADUD, QUR’AN AND WOMAN: REREADING THE SACRED TEXT FROM 
A WOMAN’S PERSPECTIVE 1 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1999) (1992); ASMA BARLAS, 
“BELIEVING WOMEN” IN ISLAM: UNREADING PATRIARCHAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 
QUR’AN 2 (2002). 
23. See infra Section III.A. 
24. ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA‘IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE 
FUTURE OF SHARI‘A 1 (2008) (“In order to be a Muslim by conviction and free 
choice, which is the only way one can be a Muslim, I need a secular state.”). 
25. MONA ELTAHAWY, HEADSCARVES AND HYMENS: WHY THE MIDDLE EAST NEEDS A 
SEXUAL REVOLUTION 31 (2015) (“The battles over women’s bodies can be won only 
by a revolution of the mind.”). 
2017 The “Tunisian” Spring 283 
 
experience reflects aspects of these diverse perspectives, although 
secular feminism maintains the strongest presence in Tunisian social 
discourse, politics, and law. 
This Article examines women’s rights in Tunisia after more than 
six years since a popular uprising forced longtime autocrat Ben Ali to 
flee the country, which allowed Tunisian democracy to begin to take 
hold.  Further, it explores what, if any, broader implications Tunisia’s 
women’s rights movement has for other states in North Africa or the 
Middle East.  Part II reconsiders the Arab Spring through a critical 
perspective, while also assessing how Tunisian exceptionalism and 
the Islamist Ennahda party situate Tunisia in this larger dynamic.26  
Part III discusses Islamic feminism and examines how this innovative 
school of thought contributes to the struggle for advancing women’s 
rights and achieving gender equality throughout Islamic and Muslim 
majority states.27  Finally, Part IV explores women’s rights in 
Tunisia, both before and after the 2010–2011 revolution, and assesses 
how these rights relate to Tunisia’s legal tradition, historical legacy, 
and significant legal developments that occurred after the 
revolution.28 
II. RECONSIDERING THE ARAB SPRING 
Few, if any, expected the Arab Spring.29  Western analysts and host 
country observers alike failed to predict the civil protests and popular 
uprisings that commentators quickly characterized as the Arab 
Spring.30  Most accounts mark the beginning of the Arab Spring as 
December 18, 2010, when protests broke out after the self-
immolation of Tunisian street vender Mohamed Bouazizi.31  
Bouazizi’s self-immolation followed years of harassment and abuse 
 
26. See infra Part II. 
27. See infra Part III. 
28. See infra Part IV. 
29. See, e.g., F. Gregory Gause III, Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: 
The Myth of Authoritarian Stability, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 81, 81 (2011) (“The vast 
majority of academic specialists on the Arab world were as surprised as everyone 
else by the upheavals that toppled two Arab leaders last winter and that now threaten 
several others.”). 
30. See Jeff Goodwin, Why We Were Surprised (Again) by the Arab Spring, 17 SWISS 
POL. SCI. REV. 452, 452 (2011) (“[N]o social scientist or political analyst in either 
the West or the Arab world itself claims to have predicted these uprisings, so far as I 
am aware.  Nor did any Western or Arab intelligence agency predict them.  In fact, 
the very people who participated in these uprisings, including long-time activists, do 
not seem to have foreseen them.”). 
31. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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from local authorities, a pattern repeated throughout Tunisia during 
President Ben Ali’s authoritarian and highly corrupt rule.32 
Within Tunisia, popular protests spread quickly, and Ben Ali fled 
to Saudi Arabia to escape the collapse of his rule.33  Following this 
dramatic departure, a caretaker national government assumed the 
daily activities of the state before holding elections on October 23, 
2011.34  The formerly banned Ennahda (Renaissance) party won the 
largest share of seats in the National Constituent Assembly,35 which 
held the responsibility of drafting Tunisia’s post-revolutionary 
constitution.36  Drafting and implementing a new constitution was the 
foremost priority for the newly elected government, although this 
process proved much more difficult and time-consuming than 
anticipated.37 
By 2013, social and political tensions were extremely high, as 
Tunisia’s nascent democracy appeared on the verge of collapse.38  
The constitution remained incomplete, as Ennahda and rival parties 
struggled to resolve strong differences on key legal issues.39  A 
stagnant economy and general feeling that democracy could not 
address the fundamental socioeconomic issues at the heart of the 
 
32. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
33. Tunisia: Ex-President Ben Ali Flees to Saudi Arabia, BBC NEWS (Jan. 15, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12198106. 
34. Tunisia’s Interim Government Delays Election, BBC NEWS (June 8, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13702372; see also Tunisia: Ex-
President Ben Ali Flees to Saudi Arabia, supra note 33. 
35. See Ennahda Wins Tunisia’s Elections, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 28, 2011), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/10/2011102721287933474.html. 
36. Tunisia Constituent Body Holds First Session, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 22, 2011), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/11/2011112217751533504.html (“The 
politicians, who will be entrusted with drafting a new constitution and paving the 
way for fresh elections, sang the national anthem as the session got under way in the 
Bardo palace, on the outskirts of Tunis.”). 
37. Tunisia Begins Landmark Debate on Draft Constitution, NAHARNET (July 1, 2013, 
8:43 AM), http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/88921 (“Tunisia’s first parliamentary 
debate on the draft constitution was suspended on Monday amid chaotic scenes in 
the National Assembly, with tensions between the ruling Islamists and their 
opponents flaring over the long-delayed text.”).  In addition to disagreements over 
the constitutional text, the drafters struggled even to agree upon the political system 
that the constitution would serve.  Id. (“The main political parties were originally 
given a year to draft the text after the first post-revolution elections in October 2011, 
but the timetable was repeatedly revised amid disagreement about the nature of 
Tunisia’s future political system.”). 
38. See Ridha Kéfi, Tunisia: Civil Society, the Driving Force Behind the Democratic 




39. See id. 
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revolution contributed to this crisis.40  These factors, alongside a rise 
in religious extremism and the assassinations of leftist politicians 
Chokri Belaid on February 6, 2013, and Mohamed Brahmi on July 
25, 2013, brought the country to the brink of civil war.41 
Tunisia’s remarkable recovery from this point onward is well-
known.  Civil society organizations intervened at this crucial 
impasse, creating a National Dialogue that saw the main political 
parties compromise on contested issues, dissolve the government, 
hold new elections, and eventually adopt a new constitution.42  The 
four civil society organizations that established and drove the 
National Dialogue became known as the National Quartet.43  Over 
the course of several months, the Quartet worked closely with the 
leaders of Tunisia’s political parties, culminating in a voluntary 
dissolution of the elected government and the decision to hold new 
elections by the end of 2014.44  Following a second round of post-
revolutionary elections, the Tunisian parliament drafted a new 
constitution, which it then adopted on January 26, 2014.45  As noted 
 
40. See id. 
41. Id.; Monica Marks, Tunisia’s Ennahda: Rethinking Islamism in the Context of ISIS 
and the Egyptian Coup, in RETHINKING POLITICAL ISLAM SERIES 1, 8–9 (2015) 
[hereinafter Marks I], https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Tunisia_Marks-FINALE-5.pdf; see also Carlotta Gall, 
Islamist Party in Tunisia Concedes to Secularists, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2014) 
[hereinafter Gall I], 
 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/world/africa/nidaa-tounes-ennahda-tunisian-
parliamentary-election.html (“Many Ennahda members had emerged from prison or 
had returned from exile after the revolution and were afforded some sympathy.  Yet 
they proved largely inexperienced and unable to manage the mounting instability, 
and alienated many by allowing a rapid spread of Islamist groups, some of which 
turned to violence.”). 
42. Kéfi, supra note 38, at 239–40 (“A marathon of meetings from September to 
December 2013 allowed them to reach a solution acceptable to all parties, which 
consisted in dissolving of the government, establishing a technocratic government 
entrusted with managing daily affairs and creating the conditions for holding 
legislative and presidential elections by the end of 2014, and accelerating the 
adoption of the new constitution.”). 
43. Borger, supra note 16. 
44. Id.; Kéfi, supra note 38, at 239–40. 
45. See Tunisia Signs New Constitution, GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2014, 10:38 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/tunisia-signs-new-constitution-
progressive; Tunisia Signs New Constitution into Law, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 27, 2014), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/01/tunisia-assembly-approves-new-
constitution-201412622480531861.html  (“The new constitution, seen as one of the 
most progressive in the region, guarantees equal rights for men and women.”).  
Furthermore, then President Moncef Marzouki stated: “With the birth of this text, we 
confirm our victory over dictatorship.”  Id. 
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above, the Quartet received the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize Award for its 
efforts.46 
Now, more than six years removed from the start of the Arab 
Spring, Tunisia is the only country that emerged as a democratic 
state.47  Across North Africa and the Middle East, popular uprisings 
gave way to authoritarian resilience, military coups, and civil war.48  
Despite the democratic promise of the initial protests, many 
commentators now question whether the region is worse than it was 
before the uprisings began.49  Darker and more pessimistic narratives 
have replaced those that all but guaranteed a revitalized Arab world 
rooted in democracy and human rights.50  Likewise, narratives 
focused on Tunisian exceptionalism abound, as scholars and analysts 
attempt to explain how Tunisia succeeded where other states failed.51 
This Part continues by arguing for a more critical understanding of 
the Arab Spring that challenges simplistic narratives and addresses 
the more unsettling outcomes created by these popular uprisings.52  It 
also explores Tunisian exceptionalism and the history, evolution, and 
governance of Ennahda.53  A fuller comprehension of the Arab 
Spring, Tunisian exceptionalism, and Ennahda, are necessary to 
understand the success of women’s rights activists in maintaining and 
then advancing women’s rights in Tunisia after the revolution. 
 
46. The Nobel Peace Prize for 2015, supra note 16. 
47. See Soumaya Ghannoushi, Tunisia is Showing the Arab World How to Nurture 
Democracy, GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2014, 6:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/25/tunisia-arab-world-
democracy-elections; Ariel Zilber, Has Tunisia Replaced Israel as the Middle East’s 
Only Genuine Democracy?, JERUSALEM POST (Apr. 2, 2016, 3:37 AM), 
http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Has-Tunisia-replaced-Israel-as-the-Middle-Easts-
only-genuine-democracy-449905 (discussing Tunisia’s status as the sole democratic 
state in the Middle East). 
48. See The Arab Winter, ECONOMIST (Jan. 9, 2016), 
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21685503-five-years-after-
wave-uprisings-arab-world-worse-ever. 
49. See, e.g., id.; Michael J. Totten, Year Four: The Arab Spring Proved Everyone 
Wrong, WORLD AFF. J. (2014), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/year-four-
arab-spring-proved-everyone-wrong. 
50. See, e.g., Kamel Daoud, The Sexual Misery of the Arab World, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 
2016) [hereinafter Daoud I], 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/opinion/sunday/the-sexual-misery-of-the-arab-
world.html (“Those movements have come to look imperfect, even ugly: For one 
thing, they have failed to touch ideas, culture, religion or social norms, especially the 
norms relating to sex.  Revolution doesn’t mean modernity.”). 
51. See Zilber, supra note 47. 
52. See infra Sections II.A–II.B. 
53. See infra Section II.C. 
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A. Toward a More Critical Understanding of the Arab Spring 
 1.    Reductionist Narratives 
Dichotomies are seldom helpful in understanding political 
dynamics or social change.  This is certainly true in post-Arab Spring 
countries.54  For example, although often relied upon to explain social 
tension and political violence, simplistic democratic-versus-Islamist 
narratives do not adequately describe the complex and evolving 
nature of the political economies within these states.  As Ashraf El 
Sherif argues, “it makes no sense today to divide Arab politics into 
neatly crafted opposites, the ‘Islamist’ versus the ‘civil democratic’ 
blocs.”55  Indeed, Islamist movements in the post-Arab Spring 
Middle East and North Africa show significant diversity and include 
reformists, members of the old Islamist guard, militants, and 
revisionists.56 
Likewise, Paola Rivetti argues that scholarly assessments of the 
Arab Spring tend to fall between a binary dynamic of democratic 
change or authoritarian continuity.57  Instead, she argues that, when 
examining any revolutionary process, “there should also be an 
emphasis on what has not suddenly changed from one day to the 
next, and more attention should be paid to long term processes of 
change, whose culminating moments are revolutions, instead of 
conceptualising revolutions as unexpected and sudden events.”58 
 2.    Who Says the Revolution Is Over? 
While reductionist narratives fail to advance a sound understanding 
of the complex situation within the Arab Spring-affected countries, so 
too does shortsighted analysis that attempts to make final 
pronouncements on the success or failure of the uprisings.  The 
tendency to make such pronouncements was especially evident in the 
weeks and months that immediately followed the Arab Spring.  Thus, 
Magid Shihade argues that even scholars sympathetic to the struggles 
 
54. Nadia Marzouki, Tunisia’s Rotten Compromise, MIDDLE E. RES. & INFO. PROJECT 
(July 10, 2015), http://www.merip.org/mero/mero071015 (“The approach of Western 
countries to the Arab world often fluctuates between indifference and indiscriminate 
applause.”). 
55. Ashraf El Sherif, Islamism After the Arab Spring, 110 CURRENT HIST. 358, 358 
(2011). 
56. Id. at 359–62. 
57. Paola Rivetti, Continuity and Change Before and After the Uprisings in Tunisia, 
Egypt and Morocco: Regime Reconfiguration and Policymaking in North Africa, 42 
BRIT. J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 1, 1 (2015). 
58. Id. 
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of the Arab people have “rushed quickly to claim expertise on the 
Arab revolution, and to make early judgments on it weeks or [a] few 
months after it started, as if it is something that ended, rather than 
seeing it as something that is in the making.”59  As a comparison, 
Shihade notes that the French Revolution took ten years to complete, 
only to become a force of colonial oppression and foreign 
intervention within the Third World.60  Thus, Shihade finds that it is 
much more useful to view these revolutions as a “continuous 
process,” rather than a neatly defined event that ended as soon as the 
crowds dispersed or the leaders fled.61 
Rivetti arrives at a similar conclusion, finding that “no regime 
surviving the uprisings has remained the same and no ‘new’ regime 
in place after the uprisings is entirely new.”62  Insightfully, she notes 
that “elements of both rupture and stability are present at the same 
time.”63  Olfa Youssef, a Tunisian professor and linguist, takes a 
different position, arguing that the Tunisian Revolution was not in 
fact a revolution.64  Instead, Youssef concludes that Tunisia 
experienced “an uprising staged by marginalized and unemployed 
people, subsequently hijacked by intellectuals and youths who were 
eager to gain freedom, whilst the uprising was then backed by foreign 
powers and fulfilled by the flight of the former president.”65 
Although disconcerting, Youssef’s interpretation of the uprisings 
invites a more critical and perhaps more thoughtful analysis of these 
events.  For example, her assertion of what amounts to a social class 
co-option of street level protests and the charge of strategic foreign 
support problematizes less nuanced readings of these events.66  Social 
class issues in particular create a challenge that Tunisia has yet to 
 
59. Magid Shihade, On the Difficulty in Predicting and Understanding the Arab Spring: 
Orientalism, Euro-Centrism, and Modernity, 17 INT’L J. PEACE STUD. 57, 60 (2012). 
60. Id.; cf. Marzouki, supra note 54 (“The encomia are often based on the patronizing 
assumption that Tunisia’s achievements are ‘good enough’ for an Arab country, or 
on the Western-centric consideration that it took France and America two centuries 
to achieve several of the democratic goals that underpinned their respective 
revolutions.”). 
61. Shihade, supra note 59, at 67. 
62. Rivetti, supra note 57, at 5. 
63. Id. at 6.  Furthermore, she notes that determining when the uprisings “actually 
started and when they terminated is a rather difficult, if not impossible task.”  Id. at 
7. 
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address in a satisfactory manner following the revolution.67  Ben 
Ali’s repressive government did not allow Tunisians to work through 
these and other issues, and instead forced a false image of unification 
and social homogeneity that did not exist beyond a superficially 
imposed level.68  Monica Marks makes this point as well, stating: 
“Forced to look into regime-manufactured funhouse mirrors that 
showed only images of progress, stability, and unification, Tunisian 
society was unable to truthfully confront itself before the revolution, 
let alone grapple with its long-repressed issues of discontent and 
difference.”69 
B. Unsettling Outcomes 
In addition to these difficult questions, it is important to address the 
negative and often violent outcomes that accompanied or followed 
popular uprisings throughout the Middle East and North Africa.  The 
decline of human rights, fractured communities, failed economies, 
and loss of security throughout the region showed the dark side of 
these popular uprisings, and provides a stark reminder that the fall of 
regimes—even those as repressive as that of Muammar Gaddafi or 
Hosni Mubarak—can result in arguably worse conditions for the 
citizens of these states.70  Although Tunisia escaped the civil wars of 
Syria and Yemen, the chronic violence of Libya and Iraq, and the 
revitalized repression of Egypt and Bahrain, it nonetheless 
 
67. See Michael Robbins, Five Years After the Revolution, More and More Tunisians 
Support Democracy, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (May 20, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/20/are-tunisians-
more-optimistic-about-democracy-after-5-years-living-under-it/ (discussing the 
Tunisian population’s embrace of democracy and struggle to improve its economy 
and unify the different sections of Tunisian society). 
68. Monica L. Marks, Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? Ennahda’s Approach to 
Tunisia’s Constitution, BROOKINGS DOHA CTR. 11 (2014) [hereinafter Marks II], 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Ennahda-Approach-
Tunisia-Constitution-English.pdf; see also Ahmed Medien, Ben Ali’s Political 
Propaganda Conspicuously Absent, TUNIS. LIVE (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.tunisia-
live.net/2011/11/07/november-7th-2011-ends-up-with-ben-alis-political-propaganda/ 
(discussing Ben Ali’s manipulation of media and other sources as a mechanism for 
maintaining superficial homogeneity and unification). 
69. Marks II, supra note 68, at 11. 
70. See, e.g., Joshua Keating, Cairo Quiet on Anniversary of Uprising, SLATE (Jan. 25, 
2016, 3:37 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/01/25/cairo_quiet_on_anniversary_of_
uprising_that_brought_down_mubarak.html (“Five years after the revolution, 
Egypt’s military-backed government is firmly in control, and in some ways more 
repressive than the Mubarak regime ever was.”). 
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encountered serious obstacles that threatened its transition to a 
democratic state.71 
A weak economy and persistent socioeconomic concerns provided 
the greatest structural and long-term obstacles to Tunisia’s 
democratic transition, but the rise of a militant Salifist movement 
presented a more immediate obstacle.72  Long repressed under Ben 
Ali’s secular authoritarianism, ultraconservative Salafis used the 
departure of Ben Ali to reassert themselves into Tunisia’s social 
discourse and political debate.73  Of course, Salafi itself is a 
problematic term that many conflate with militancy or violence.74  In 
contrast, numerous conservative Muslims identify as Salafist in some 
way without resorting to violence.  Nonetheless, a small militant 
Salifist movement emerged in Tunisia, threatening the country’s 
peace and security.75 
Shortly after the revolution, Salafis began attacking alcohol stores 
and destroying Sufi shrines.76  Self-identified Salafis also attacked the 
Tunisian General Labor Union during peaceful demonstrations.77  
The role of Islam in Tunisia’s post-revolutionary state remained the 
most divisive aspect of the transition, and many felt that Ennahda 
could have done more to prevent these attacks and acted with too 
 
71. Christian Åhlund, Four Years After the Revolution: Tunisia Still Upholds the Values 
of the Arab Spring, INT’L LEGAL ASSISTANCE CONSORTIUM: BLOG (Jan. 13, 2015), 
http://www.ilacnet.org/blog/2015/01/13/four-years-after-the-revolution-tunisia-still-
upholds-the-values-of-the-arab-spring/. 
72. See Lisa Watanabe, Tunisia: The Challenges of Transition, CTR. FOR SECURITY 
STUD. ANALYSIS 1–3 (2013), http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-
interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSS-Analysis-135-EN.pdf 
(discussing the political, socioeconomic, and other challenges facing the Tunisian 
people in the wake of their revolution). 
73. Monica Marks, Who are Tunisia’s Salafis?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 28, 2012) 
[hereinafter Marks III], http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/28/who-are-tunisias-
salafis/. 
74. Stephen Zhou, “Salafi” Does Not Equal “Terrorist”: Stop Assuming all 
Conservative Muslims Are Violent Extremists, SALON (Dec. 21, 2015, 6:58 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/2015/12/21/salafi_does_not_equal_terrorist_stop_assuming_a
ll_conservative_muslims_are_violent_extremists/. 
75. See Tunisian Court Jails Salafists for Burning Sufi Shrine, VOICE AM. NEWS (June 
18, 2013, 1:31 PM) [hereinafter VOA], http://www.voanews.com/content/tunisian-
court-jails-salafists-for-burning-sufi-shrine/1684244.html (discussing the increased 
risk of violence in areas where Salafist groups are present). 
76. Marks II, supra note 68, at 8; see also VOA, supra note 75 (discussing the increased 
risk of violence in areas where Salafist groups are present). 
77. Ahmed Charai & Joseph Braude, Tunisia Is No Exception, NAT’L INT. (Feb. 15, 
2013), http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/tunisia-no-exception-8108 (“Islamists 
were largely absent from the 2010–2011 demonstrations that led to the ouster of 
former president Ben Ali . . . .”). 
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much leniency afterwards.78  Counterinsurgency strategists note that 
groups target cultural artifacts and religious shrines for a variety of 
reasons, including to reassert power by “rewriting history and 
obliterating alternative religious and ideological narratives.”79  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Salafist attacks on Sufi shrines triggered a 
strong Islamist backlash.80 
This backlash reached its peak following the assassinations of 
leftist politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi.81  Although 
the animus toward Islamist groups has largely subsided, religious 
extremism persists, as demonstrated by the March 18, 2015 attack on 
the Bardo Museum that left twenty-two people dead and an even 
deadlier mass shooting on June 26, 2015 at a tourist resort north of 
Sousse that resulted in thirty-eight deaths.82  Furthermore, by the end 
of 2015, between 6,000 and 7,000 Tunisians had left the country to 
fight for ISIS, and as many as 15,000 Tunisians received an 
international travel ban because government officials suspected them 
of ISIS.83  Incredibly, even a conservative estimate that 6,000 
Tunisians joined ISIS is considerably more than the next two highest-
 
78. See Carlotta Gall, Islamist Party in Tunisia to Step Down, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 
2013) [hereinafter Gall II], 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/world/africa/islamist-party-in-tunisia-to-step-
down.html (noting the opposing parties’ increased frustration with Ennahda); VOA, 
supra note 75 (“But secularists say the Ennahda party, the Tunisian arm of the 
Muslim Brotherhood which governs in coalition with secular parties, has been too 
lenient on the Salafists, giving them the confidence to step up their demands.”). 
79. Christopher Jasparro, The Case for Cultural Heritage Protection as an Element of 
COIN, in THE FUTURE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN 
INTERNAL SECURITY STRATEGY 91, 96 (Lawrence E. Cline & Paul Shemella eds., 
2015). 
80. Ishaan Tharoor, The Beautiful, Historic Shrines that Islamists Try to Destroy, WASH. 
POST (July 25, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/07/25/the-beautiful-
historic-shrines-that-islamists-try-to-destroy/. 
81. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also Marks II, supra note 68, at 8 n.15, 
29 (discussing the organization and challenges faced by Ennahda). 
82. David D. Kirkpatrick, Tunisia Museum Attack Is Blow to Nation’s Democratic Shift, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/19/world/africa/gunmen-attack-tunis-bardo-
national-museum.html?_r=1; Farah Samti & Carlotta Gall, Tunisia Attack Kills at 
Least 38 at Beach Resort Hotel, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/world/africa/gunmen-attack-hotel-in-sousse-
tunisia.html. 
83. Yaroslav Trofimov, How Tunisia Became a Top Source of ISIS Recruits, WALL ST. J. 
(Feb. 25, 2016, 5:30 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-tunisia-became-a-top-
source-of-isis-recruits-1456396203. 
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contributing countries combined: Saudi Arabia (2,500) and Russia 
(2,400).84 
While Tunisia’s democracy has so far managed to withstand this 
political violence, the large number of ISIS defections, as well as less 
obvious socioeconomic indicators, demonstrate that dissatisfaction 
remains high, at least within a particular segment of Tunisian 
society.85  Whether this dissatisfaction will reach a point where it 
threatens Tunisia’s democracy remains unknown.86  At the very least, 
this violence frustrates Tunisia’s transition toward a full-fledged and 
inclusive democracy and complicates the dominant narrative of 
Tunisia’s exceptionalism. 
C. Tunisian Exceptionalism 
Tunisia has proved to be the exception to the rule in the Arab 
Spring, as it remains the only country to transition successfully to a 
democratic state.87  In 2015, Freedom House assessed Tunisia as 
free—the organization’s “most free” country designation—marking 
the first time that a North African state received this designation 
since Freedom House began its annual assessment of political and 
civil rights in 1972.88  Furthermore, Tunisia is the only Arab-majority 
country to receive Freedom House’s “free” designation since 
Lebanon did between 1974 and 1976.89 
Tunisian exceptionalism, in addition to whether this outcome is 
replicable within other Arab states, has become an incredibly popular 
topic for academics, policymakers, and journalists, as demonstrated 
by an already substantial academic and popular literature, as well as 
numerous academic conferences and symposia dedicated to this 
topic.90  As the narrative of the Arab Spring darkens with ongoing 
 
84. Id.; Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment on the Flow of Foreign Fighters into 
Syria and Iraq, THE SOUFAN GROUP 9 (Dec. 2015), http://soufangroup.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf. 
85. See Trofimov, supra note 83. 
86. For an argument that Salafists will not have a lasting effect on Tunisia, see El Sherif, 
supra note 55, at 363 (finding that the Salafists and the Islamic Liberation Party 
“[a]re not likely to make much noise” because “they are past their prime”). 
87. Fagan, supra note 15. 
88. Id. 
89. Puddington, supra note 15, at 1. 
90. For a few of the numerous books and articles discussing this question, see Kéfi, 
supra note 38, at 237 (“In the devastated landscape of what has rather hastily been 
called the Arab Spring, Tunisia is an exception.”) (characterizing Tunisia as “a 
relative island of stability in a chaotic region” and “a sort of solitary democracy lost 
in an ocean of autocratic regimes and failed states”); Owen Bennett-Jones, Is Tunisia 
a Role Model for the Arab World?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30273807; Kamel Daoud, Tunisia Is the 
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civil wars and the resurgence of repressive governments 
overshadowing earlier and more hopeful moments, some 
commentators have expressed doubt that Tunisia’s democratic 
government will avoid a similar fate.91  Although these gloomy 
predictions have not occurred, a replication of the Tunisian exception 
seems unlikely, especially in the short-term.92 
Moreover, Tunisian exceptionalism does not always benefit the 
country.  For example, Tunisia’s successful democratic transition, in 
conjunction with the failure of other Arab states to become 
democratic and secure, has made Tunisia a target of Islamist 
militants, including ISIS, as these militants have filled power 
vacuums left from unsuccessful transitions.93  Tunisia’s geography 
only increases these security concerns, as it is “sandwiched between 
 
Exception, Not the Model, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Daoud II], 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/28/opinion/tunisia-is-the-exception-not-the-
rule.html (“Tunisia is less a model than a unique case.”); Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, 
Tunisia: Exemplar or Exception?, FOREIGN POL’Y RES. INST. (Jan. 2011), 
http://www.fpri.org/docs/media/201101.maddy-weitzman.tunisia.pdf (“Tunisia 
seems to be more of an exceptional case, rather than an applicable model and a 
trigger for cascading popular democratic movements elsewhere.”).  For two recent 
examples of academic events taking up this topic, see Frej Stambouli, Is Tunisia an 
Exception Within the “Arab Spring”?, U. HELSINKI, SWED. SCH. SOC. SCI. (Jan. 27, 
2015, 2:15 PM), http://sockom.helsinki.fi/ceren/aktuellt/Stambouli_270115.pdf; 
International Symposium on Democratic Transition, DEAKIN U. (Sept. 11, 2015), 
http://www.deakin.edu.au/alfred-deakin-institute/news/news-archive/2015-
archive/democratic-transition-in-tunisia. 
91. But see Richard Cincotta, Will Tunisia’s Democracy Survive? A View from Political 
Demography, NEW SECURITY BEAT (May 12, 2015), 
https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2015/05/tunisias-democracy-survive-view-
political-demography/ (“From political demography’s statistical perspective, Tunisia 
is far from the anomaly that Middle East analysts too often portray it to be.”).  
Cincotta further argues that by applying an age-structural model to predict whether 
states will attain liberal democracy, political demographers predicted Tunisia would 
become a liberal democracy in 2010.  Id. 
92. Joshua Keating, Why Was Tunisia the Only Arab Spring Country that Turned Out 
Well?, SLATE (Jan. 28, 2015, 3:58 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/01/28/why_was_tunisia_the_only_arab
_spring_country_that_turned_out_well.html (“Tunisia is still the Arab Spring’s lone 
success story.  The problem, for those who would seek to apply lessons of the 
‘Tunisia model’ elsewhere, is that the circumstances that allowed this to happen are 
pretty specific and hard to replicate.”). 
93. Michael D. Rich & K. Jack Riley, Tunisia in the Crosshairs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (June 22, 2015, 1:30 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-
report/2015/06/22/tunisia-arab-spring-success-story-is-a-key-target-of-islamic-state-
group (“Tunisia, which gave birth to the Arab Spring more than four years ago, 
stands out as a notable exception, making it an inviting target for threats from the 
Islamic State group.”). 
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two larger, and substantially less secure, neighbors (Algeria and 
Libya).”94 
Given the failure of other Arab states to achieve a similar 
transition, it is worth considering which factors contributed most 
strongly to Tunisia’s positive and markedly different outcome.  
Historian L. Carl Brown notes that unlike some Arab states, “Tunisia 
is ethnically, religiously and linguistically unified.”95  Fellow 
historian Bruce Maddy-Weitzman also notes the relatively strong 
degree of social cohesion within Tunisian society: “Tunisia’s pre-
colonial and colonial eras had already laid the groundwork for a 
compact, well-defined entity which evolved into a relatively 
homogenous national state, one with a high degree of legitimacy and 
collective consciousness.”96  In addition, a sizable middle class, a 
large industrial sector, and very limited oil and gas reserves did not 
allow for the establishment of a rent-seeking regime similar to nearby 
Libya or Sudan, and instead contributed to a society less likely to be 
susceptible to divisive tactics during a national uprising.97  Of course, 
political activists and civil society organizations also played crucial 
roles during the uprisings—a topic addressed more fully below.98  
Finally, the restraint of the Tunisian Army was crucial.99  Never a 
significant part of President Habib Bourguiba or President Ben Ali’s 
political apparatus, the commander of the Tunisian Army refused Ben 
Ali’s order that the army confront the protestors.100  Indeed, unlike in 
Egypt, Tunisia’s army remained “solidly off stage.”101 
While Tunisia is very much an exception, an uncritical reliance on 
this narrative carries risk as well.  In 2015, former Tunisian Minister 
of Communications Oussama Romdhani argued that, as a cultural 
exception, Tunisia “has been atrophying for decades now.”102  
 
94. Id. 
95. L. Carl Brown, The Tunisian Exception, INFORMED COMMENT (Oct. 14, 2014), 
http://www.juancole.com/2014/10/the-tunisian-exception.html 
96. Maddy-Weitzman, supra note 90. 
97. Id. 
98. See infra notes 238–41 and accompanying text. 
99. Brown, supra note 95. 
100. Id. 
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Romdhani also argued that for a subsection of the population, 
Tunisia’s values of moderation and openness “have proved to be no 
match to the onslaught of religious extremism brought about by 
Middle Eastern preachers and amplified by satellite television and the 
[I]nternet.”103 
Finally, by uncritically regarding Tunisia as exceptional, Orientalist 
narratives suggesting that Tunisia’s exceptionalism proves a larger 
rule of the incompatibility between Arab states and democracy may 
take root.104  As Marzouki and Meddeb note: “Since December 2014, 
Western officials and analysts have very actively, almost 
aggressively, celebrated the Tunisian ‘success,’ which is alternatively 
defined as an ‘exception’ or a ‘model’ in a chaotic Arab world.”105  
Simply labeling Tunisia exceptional for showing an absence of chaos 
does not adequately reflect the struggle and achievement of reaching 
and maintaining democracy.  Furthermore, such a perspective 
implicitly equates chaos as the norm, suggesting that Tunisia is an 
outlier, whereas authoritarianism or lawlessness is expected.  Lastly, 
celebrating Tunisia’s procedural democracy without critically 
appraising whether conditions have improved substantively risks 
conflating successful elections with root change, which is rarely, if 
ever, true.  Thus, Marzouki emphasizes: “The narrative of Tunisian 
success based on compromise should thus be employed with extreme 
caution.  Despite great achievements since 2011, the country is very 
far from having robust political pluralism or finding political 
channels for social grievances.”106 
 
103. Id. 
104. See, e.g., Robert Springborg, Egypt: Confronting the Challenge of Low Level 
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D. Ennahda: History and Evolution, Governance and Compromise 
Although the National Quartet rightfully received the Nobel Peace 
Prize, Ennahda also deserves significant credit for its contribution to 
Tunisia’s democratic transition.107 
 1.    Political History and Evolution 
Ennahda’s strong commitment to democracy, tolerance, and 
pluralism, as well as its willingness to re-examine its positions and 
evolve, distinguish it not only from other Islamist political parties, 
but also from the majority of political parties within the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA).108  Particularly after the revolution, many 
Tunisians viewed Ennahda as a legitimate alternative to the 
repressive governance that defined the Bourguiba and Ben Ali 
regimes.109  Additionally, Ennahda developed good working 
relationships with human rights organizations, labor unions, and other 
opposition parties by enduring similar experiences of repression.110  
Although post-revolution electoral politics strained these 
relationships, these shared experiences allowed for an initial spirit of 
trust and cooperation that was absent in similar dealings within other 
Arab states. 
Ennahda began as the Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique, 
before a Ben Ali-era law disallowing political party names to contain 
religious references forced the party to change its name.111  Rachid 
Ghannouchi and other Islamic leaders founded Ennahda in 1981.112  
From its inception, Ennahda was markedly different from most other 
Islamist parties.  As El Sherif notes, in 1981, Ennahda became the 
first Islamist movement within the MENA region to “declare its full 
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(unpublished essay, Wellesley College) (one file with E-Int’l Rel.), http://www.e-
ir.info/2011/01/31/arab-exceptionalism-tunisia%E2%80%99s-islamist-movement/. 
2017 The “Tunisian” Spring 297 
 
commitment to the values of democracy, multiparty politics, and 
pluralism.”113  Because this movement was viewed as a symbol of 
political change, President Bourguiba ordered the arrest of Ennahda’s 
leaders only six weeks after the party’s founding.114  Bourguiba then 
banned the party and persecuted its members.115  Following 
Bourguiba’s removal from power in 1987, Ennahda leaders attempted 
to reconcile with the government.116  Newly elected President Ben 
Ali was initially receptive to these conciliatory gestures and allowed 
Ennahda to pursue some political activities, culminating in Ennahda’s 
participation in the creation of Tunisia’s national charter in 1988.117 
Ennahda’s emphasis on democracy and pluralism threatened Ben 
Ali, and the party quickly fell back out of favor.118  Ghannouchi was 
forced to flee Tunisia in 1989, and Ben Ali refused to recognize 
Ennahda as a legal party when he created the “official opposition” in 
1992.119  Ben Ali’s government also initiated an incredible 
propaganda campaign against Ennahda, going so far as to 
characterize this moderate party as an enemy dangerous not only to 
his government, but also to civilized society.120  Despite severe state 
repression and marginalization, Ennahda remained popular and 
relevant, especially within poor urban areas where its informal 
networks of assistance and social services met needs that the 
government did not.121  Ghannouchi returned to Tunisia on January 
30, 2011 after twenty-two years in exile, but declined to pursue a 
position in government, and instead remained head of Ennahda.122 
Although the Ennahda of post-revolutionary Tunisia is, in the 
words of political scientist Shadi Hamid, “as ‘moderate’ as you can 
probably get in the Arab world and still call yourself Islamist,” the 
party was not always orientated this way.123  As Marks notes, 
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embraced democracy as a “universal heritage” and supported tolerance and 
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Ennahda has undergone two significant shifts in ideology and 
political philosophy since its founding.  In the 1980s, the party broke 
with its conservative Salafist wing, and in the 1990s, Ghannouchi and 
other Ennahda leaders re-articulated the party’s views during a major 
re-evaluation.124  Ennahda’s political platform reflected these shifts 
and focused on community development, human rights, and civil 
society, rather than “the talismanic metapolitics of the ‘Islamic state’ 
and sharia.”125  Moreover, even though many commentators 
portrayed Ennahda as an incredibly well-organized and disciplined 
party, there was and still is considerable diversity among its 
members, even on key issues.126 
 2.    Governance and the Politics of Compromise 
Following the revolution, Ennahda emerged as the most effective 
and tested political party within Tunisia.127  The 2011 elections 
reflected this standing, as Ennahda won the most seats (eighty-nine) 
and joined the liberal Congress for the Republic and the leftist 
Ettakatol Party to form a ruling coalition.128  Nonetheless, after its 
success in the 2011 elections, Ennahda began to lose support due to 
the country’s poor economic performance.129  Dissatisfaction only 
grew as economic conditions worsened before the critical period of 
2013 marked by the assassinations of Chokri Belaid and Mohamed 
Brahmi discussed above.130  In February 2013, Prime Minister 
Hamadi Jebali resigned after he could not form a political coalition 
following Belaid’s assassination.131  This killing caused widespread 
protests and effectively ground the transitional government to a 
halt.132  Together, the economic stagnation and political violence 
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proved too divisive, and Ennahda and its secular opposition reached a 
political impasse that became insurmountable.133 
In an attempt to restart the political process, the National Quartet 
intervened in the summer of 2013.134  By late September, Ennahda 
agreed to step down after months of difficult negotiation with its 
political opposition.135  Ennahda ceded power to an independent 
caretaker government tasked to run the country until elections in the 
spring of 2014.136  Importantly, neither Ennahda nor its secular rivals 
attempted unilateral or exclusive measures to resolve this impasse, 
instead choosing negotiation, as both sides realized that a prolonged 
political stalemate would seriously harm the country and undermine 
the people’s trust in democratic governance.137  Even after agreeing 
to dissolve the government, Ennahda exceeded many expectations by 
gracefully accepting defeat and respecting the will of the Tunisian 
people.138  Indeed, the influential Algerian writer Kamel Daoud 
argues that Ennahda’s decision to step down secured stability and 
warded off violence, even though the interim government was “an 
elite consensus that trumped the electoral majority.”139  Thus, 
somewhat counterintuitively, Ennahda arguably preserved Tunisian 
democracy by allowing an unelected body to manage the state’s daily 
operations until a more permanent solution became available.140 
In addition to doing what it felt was best for the country, Ennahda’s 
political actions supported a larger strategic decision.141  Indeed, 
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perhaps the best explanation for Ennahda’s decision to relinquish 
power was the party’s belief in a “civilizational project”—a long-
term strategy that believes “Islam’s principles, broadly interpreted, 
are not only compatible with but edifying for democratic 
governance.”142  Ennahda’s confidence in its long-term approach 
allows it to take the long view and remain patient.143  Moreover, 
Ennahda was undoubtedly rattled by the events in Egypt that saw a 
swift and terrible change of fortune for the Muslim Brotherhood, 
another formerly repressed and banned Islamist party that won 
elections after a popular uprising.144  As Kasper Ly Netterstrøm 
notes, after years of exile, imprisonment, and a corresponding fear 
and distrust of the Tunisian state, for Ennahda, gaining power was 
“less a question of being able to govern than of being able to 
survive.”145  Achieving power also legitimized the party, which the 
Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes had excluded from Tunisia’s official 
history and treated as “backward and inferior.”146 
As Part III illustrates, Ennahda’s willingness to compromise after it 
achieved a legitimating amount of power ultimately contributed to 
the success of women’s rights activists in maintaining and 
strengthening their rights in post-revolutionary Tunisia.147 
III. ISLAMIC FEMINISM AND THE STRUGGLE FOR GENDER 
EQUALITY 
A. Challenging Tradition 
Islamic feminists seek to achieve gender equality while maintaining 
adherence to Islam.148  To do so, Islamic scholars have reinterpreted 
the legal sources of shari‘a, particularly the Qur’an and the Sunna, 
arguing that while Islam requires gender equality, centuries of 
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patriarchal interpretations and misogynistic custom have distorted 
this egalitarian directive and fundamental legal principle.149  Thus, 
rather than rejecting their faith, Islamic feminists seek to reclaim it.150  
As Elizabeth Segran notes: “Throughout the Muslim world, a 
groundswell of feminist sentiment is growing among women who are 
seeking to reclaim Islam and the Koran for themselves.”151 
While Islamic feminists have existed to various degrees throughout 
Islamic civilization, modern Islamic feminism developed alongside 
second and third-wave feminism.152  Scholars such as Leila Ahmed, 
Fatima Mernissi, Amina Wadud, and Amina Barlas developed 
sophisticated legal arguments showing the flexibility of Islamic legal 
interpretation, while remaining rooted within the Islamic tradition.153  
Another aspect of this intellectual project was to demonstrate that 
Islamic law could be subject to debate.154  Indeed, Islamic legal 
feminists reaffirmed the divineness of the Qur’an as the immutable 
word of Allah spoken through the prophet Muhammad.155  However, 
they also stressed that while the Qur’an is divine, the men and 
women seeking to understand it are fallible, and as a result, their 
interpretations are subject to debate.156  This strategy was especially 
important in the 2004 Mudawana reforms in Morocco.157 
B. Scholarly Excellence Versus Grounded Reality: The Need for 
Outreach and Education 
Despite this exemplary scholarship and persuasive legal arguments, 
gender inequality remains a daily experience for many women living 
in Muslim-majority and Islamic states.158  Patriarchal social norms 
and misguided legal interpretations drive inequality and can lead to 
harassment, abuse, violence, and even death.  As Daoud states: “In 
some places, women are veiled, stoned and killed; at a minimum, 
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Of course, gender inequality is hardly confined to Arab countries or 
Islamic states.  No society has yet achieved gender equality, and 
women’s rights remain imperfect in all states.  Nonetheless, the 
concurring invisibility and centrality of women within Arab and 
Muslim societies raise especially challenging gender issues.  Veiling 
is the most obvious social practice, particularly to non-Muslims, but 
this practice is only one of many that simultaneously centralizes 
gender while marginalizing women.160  Thus, Daoud observes: 
 Women are a recurrent theme in daily discourse, because 
the stakes they personify—for manliness, honor, family 
values—are great.  In some countries, they are allowed 
access to the public sphere only if they renounce their 
bodies: To let them go uncovered would be to uncover the 
desire that the Islamist, the conservative and the idle youth 
feel and want to deny.  Women are seen as a source of 
destabilization—short skirts trigger earthquakes, some 
say—and are respected only when defined by a property 
relationship, as the wife of X or the daughter of Y.  These 
contradictions create unbearable tensions.161 
To counter this problematic discourse, women’s rights activists 
have utilized a variety of grassroots, social mobilization, and 
lobbying efforts.  As Liv Tønnessen notes, “the [MENA] region has a 
rich and long history of women’s activism, whether protesting in the 
streets, participating in political and religious movements, charity 
networks or NGOs.”162  Islamic feminists form an important aspect of 
this history, both working alongside secular human rights-based 
activists and making their own contributions through determined 
outreach, legal education, and other strategies and activities.163 
Two of the most well-known and successful examples of Islamic 
feminist organizations are Sisters of Islam and Musawah (Equality), 
founded in Malaysia in 1988 and 2009, respectively.164  Musawah is 
likely the most influential transnational organization working for 
gender equality in the Muslim world.165  As Segran notes, “Musawah 
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operates on the belief that Islam is not inherently biased toward men: 
patriarchy within Muslim countries is a result of the way male 
interpreters have read Islamic texts.”166  This belief informs both the 
organization’s vision, “[a] world where equality, non-discrimination, 
justice, and dignity are the basis of all human relations,” and its goal,  
“[a] global movement for equality and justice in the Muslim family, 
which advances human rights for women in Muslim contexts, in both 
their public and private lives.”167  By insisting on gender equality and 
arguing that patriarchy is attributable to male interpreters, Segran 
concludes that, “Musawah empowers women to shape the 
interpretations, norms and laws that affect their lives, then push for 
legal reform in their respective countries.”168 
Musawah’s engagement strategy is quite different from that of 
most Western advocacy campaigns or international NGOs.  By 
advocating for gender equality through engagement with Islamic law 
and feminist readings of Islamic scripture, Musawah finds that 
“equality in the family laws in the Muslim world is both necessary 
and possible without stepping outside the boundaries of religion.”169  
The deep-seated patriarchy of many Muslim-majority and Islamic 
states requires significant outreach and education before men (and 
women) accept this position.  However, this initial reluctance does 
not mean that there is not substantial support for this position once it 
is presented and understood.  Zainah Anwar, the founder of Sisters of 
Islam and a key architect of Musawah, notes that when women 
realize Islam does not justify the neglect or abuse that they endure, 
the reaction is cathartic.170  She states: “When they are exposed to 
this new knowledge, they feel duped . . . . they believed that their 
suffering in the form of abandonment, polygamy and beatings was all 
in the name of God.”171  In contrast, Islamic feminists demonstrate 
that these misogynistic practices contradict the principle of gender 
equality found within Islamic law, thus removing the religious 
justification for such harmful acts. 
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IV. WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN TUNISIA 
Although women’s rights activists received considerable attention 
for their courageous acts and tireless organizing efforts throughout 
the Arab Spring protests, the history of women’s rights activism, 
organizing, and leadership within the MENA region extends much 
further than the past few years.  Modern women’s rights movements 
in the MENA region emerged as women participated in the struggle 
for national independence during the post-World War II period, 
though there are many important precursors to these movements.172  
In many examples, once these nationalist movements succeeded in 
ousting colonial rulers, they often sacrificed women’s rights in the 
interest of “national unity.”173  Likewise, women made key 
contributions to the struggle against the oppressive regimes that took 
hold in the decades following national independence, but rarely 
received the same recognition that men did for leading civil society 
efforts, human rights initiatives, and political campaigns to bring 
about social and political change.174 
Women received more attention and recognition for their 
leadership during the Arab Spring, as cable television reporting, 
Internet news platforms, and social media provided women activists 
“unprecedented visibility,” which in turn helped to “shatter 
stereotypes” that many viewers unfamiliar with the MENA region 
held.175  As the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) 
stated: “From Tunisia to Bahrain, from Egypt to Syria, women from 
all backgrounds demanded democracy, social justice, freedom, 
dignity, and equality.”176  Repressive regimes targeted—and continue 
to target—the leaders and activists that led these popular uprisings, 
often with brutal tactics and lethal force.177  Moreover, while both 
men and women were arrested, detained, tortured, and killed by these 
regimes during and after the protests, women were often targets of 
additional violence including abduction, virginity tests, sexual 
harassment, and rape.178 
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Finally, it is important to note that women’s rights activism and the 
struggle for stronger women’s rights and gender equality in the 
MENA region is marked by tensions.  These tensions include the 
disparity in effort and recognition discussed above, as well difficult 
negotiations of personal belief and entrenched patriarchal social 
norms.  In Tunisia, women’s rights leaders also confronted 
oppressive governments that attempted to co-opt women’s rights as 
part of their foreign policy and state building initiatives.  Part IV 
examines these tensions by assessing women’s rights before and after 
the Tunisian Revolution.179  First detailing the legal tradition and 
development of women’s rights before the revolution, it then 
discusses how women’s rights leaders maintained and ultimately 
strengthened women’s rights after the revolution.180  This outcome is 
evident in numerous legal acts, the most important of which are the 
Personal Status Code, the 2011 electoral law, the 2014 Constitution, 
and the withdrawing of key reservations to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW).181  Lastly, this Part concludes by assessing remaining 
legal issues that hinder women’s rights and the pursuit of gender 
equality in Tunisia.182 
A. Women’s Rights in Tunisia: Before the Revolution 
 1.    A Progressive Legal Tradition 
Tunisia’s history of strong women’s rights is at least partially due 
to its progressive legal tradition.  Tunisians abolished slavery in 
1846, long before many other Arab states, and established their first 
modern constitution in 1861.183  Not only was this constitution the 
first modern constitution in the Arab world, it was also very 
progressive and forward-looking.184  Furthermore, this constitution is 
part of a longer progressive legal tradition, including the 1857 Ahd Al 
Iman (Charter of Faith), which one scholar describes as “a path 
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breaking document that stressed on equal rights under the law for the 
non-Muslims (Jews and Christians) in various walks of life.”185  This 
legal tradition both reflects and advances Tunisian norms of 
acceptance and tolerance. 
Following independence, President Bourguiba forcefully imposed 
several progressive acts to advance women’s rights.  In 1956, 
Tunisian women gained formal equal rights in most areas of the law, 
and in 1961, Bourguiba introduced family planning throughout the 
country.186  These two reforms not only advanced women’s rights, 
but also contributed to a strong Tunisian middle class in the first few 
decades after independence.187  Although his government became 
increasingly authoritarian,188 Bourguiba nonetheless demonstrated a 
strong commitment to advancing women’s rights both legally and 
through socioeconomic advancement. 
Bourguiba also cultivated a modern mindset of women’s rights and 
women’s roles in society.  Kamel Dhif gives the following 
assessment: “[Bourguiba] introduced far-reaching, modernising 
reforms – despite the strong-arm nature of his government – in 
particular in the areas of family law and women’s rights and in 
modernising mindsets.  These reforms became very deeply engrained 
in the new Tunisian civic spirit, not just in legislation but also in 
people’s mentalities.”189  Indeed, in 2014, the staid British newspaper 
The Guardian complimented Bourguiba’s presidency, which lasted 
from 1959 until 1987, for leaving “an important legacy of public 
education, social reform and female emancipation.”190 
In contrast to Bourguiba’s rule, which descended into semi-
authoritarianism after several years of progressive, if heavy-handed 
governance, Ben Ali’s presidency almost immediately became a full-
fledged autocracy, where corruption and elite enrichment decimated 
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Tunisia’s middle class.191  Ben Ali utilized a combination of 
repressive domestic policy to stifle internal dissent and manipulative 
foreign policy to consolidate power and strengthen his authority.192  
Repressive domestic tactics included co-opting political challengers, 
intimidating and harassing critics through a well-trained and 
expansive security apparatus, and when these tactics were not 
enough, using physical violence and torture.193  Ben Ali’s foreign 
policy was more subtle and focused on portraying Tunisia as a stable, 
secular stronghold amongst a bevy of radical and dangerous Islamist 
regimes.194 
The goal of this policy was to garner international support and—
just as importantly—large donor commitments from key geopolitical 
partners, including the United States.195  The supposed safeguarding 
of women’s rights played an important part in this larger foreign 
policy strategy.196  Ben Ali often invoked human rights generally and 
women’s rights specifically, as well as his centrality to protecting 
these rights, as an important reason for continued political and 
financial support of his regime.197  He was particularly keen to 
contrast relatively strong women’s rights in Tunisia with weak 
women’s rights in other Arab and Islamic states, particularly within 
international forums.198 
This manipulation was never more evident than in the lead-up to 
the historic 1995 United Nations Conference on Women in Beijing.  
Fearing that women’s rights organizations would expose the regime’s 
many human rights abuses, as well as its self-serving and selective 
enforcement of women’s rights, Ben Ali created a state-run 
alternative, the Rihana Network, to control dissent and dominate civil 
 
191. See, e.g., Abdellatif al-Hanashi, Party Cadres Surpassed Their Leaderships During 
the Revolution, in REVOLUTIONS, REFORM, AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN THE 
ARAB HOMELAND: FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE TUNISIAN REVOLUTION 12, 12 
(Doha Inst., 2011) [hereinafter REVOLUTIONS, REFORM, AND DEMOCRATIC 
TRANSITION], http://english.dohainstitute.org/file/get/3166a949-4468-41ae-8b9e-
3096ab0d911a.pdf (noting that Ben Ali’s development policies “effectively 
produced unprecedented levels of corruption and socio-economic problems”). 
192. See Stark, supra note 112. 
193. See ALEXIS ARIEFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21666, POLITICAL TRANSITION IN 
TUNISIA 23 (2011), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/161570.pdf. 
194. See id. at 22–23. 
195. See id. at 7–8, 27–28. 
196. See Charrad & Zarrugh, supra note 18. 
197. Stark, supra note 112 (arguing that the Ben Ali regime cultivated an image of 
democratic reforms and sensitivity to human rights issues not only to gain support 
domestically, but also to promote the image of a modern Arab state abroad). 
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society messaging during the conference.199  The Rihana Network 
forced women’s rights organizations into a very difficult position, as 
they weighed the negative outcomes of missing such an important 
event with concerns over contributing to a misrepresentation of 
women’s rights in Tunisia should they participate.200  Indeed, these 
organizations understood that Ben Ali’s regime would work tirelessly 
to co-opt their message and control their activities.201  As one 
commentator notes, instead of enabling Tunisian civil society, the 
Rihana Network “functioned as a thinly veiled attempt by the state to 
control all Tunisian NGO activities at the Beijing Conference.”202 
Ultimately, the regime largely succeeded in its co-option of 
women’s rights.  As Sarah Gilman noted, although many autonomous 
feminist activists decided to participate in the [Rihana] Network to 
actively engage the state and avoid isolation and possible irrelevance, 
many of the same activists later regretted this participation believing 
that it led to even greater “co-optation and marginalization.”203  
Furthermore, after the 1995 Conference, Ben Ali’s manipulation of 
women’s rights continued in the domestic sphere, where civil society 
organizations and women’s rights leaders struggled to complete 
meaningful activities within an increasingly repressive state while 
also avoiding co-option by the regime.204  Gilman demonstrates how 
this tension required one of Tunisia’s leading women’s rights 
organizations, Femmes Démocrates, to negotiate “both the state and 
transnational linkages so as to avoid the extremes of co-optation and 
irrelevance.”205 
Despite the very serious problems discussed above, women still 
benefitted from legal protections and participation in the legal 
profession, further reflecting Tunisia’s progressive legal tradition.  
Women have served as judges since 1968, and in 2010, women 
represented 27 percent of judges and 31 percent of attorneys.206  
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Thus, despite the deeply problematic legacies of Bourguiba and Ben 
Ali, there is no doubt that these two leaders advanced and 
strengthened women’s rights—even if from a non-inclusive, top-
down approach and for questionable, if not outright self-serving 
motives.207  This tension between authoritarian rule and a progressive 
legal tradition is difficult to resolve, creating a complicated legacy for 
postcolonial Tunisia.208  The following section examines this legacy 
more closely. 
 2.    A Complicated Legacy 
Within postcolonial Tunisia, the tension between a strong, 
centralized government and a progressive legal tradition emerged, or 
perhaps solidified, during Tunisia’s struggle for independence.  
Likewise, the simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of women from 
this struggle demonstrates the uneven and at times even contradictory 
nature of the Tunisian state-building project.  This project ultimately 
resulted in Ben Ali’s autocratic regime, which although repressive 
and immensely corrupt, also featured expanded women’s rights that 
significantly outpaced similarly situated countries in the region.209 
Similar to women throughout the Middle East and North Africa, 
Tunisian women made significant contributions to the country’s 
nationalist struggle for independence following World War II.210  
While these contributions were necessary to achieve independence, 
women quickly found themselves largely shut out of political life 
after colonial forces conceded and these former colonial states gained 
independence.211  In turn, this political absence negatively affected 
women’s rights in postcolonial states.  As Tønnessen notes, “[w]hen 
the revolutionary dust cleared and constitutions were decided upon 
after independence from colonial rulers, women were by and large 
side-lined.”212  This absence was especially damaging for women’s 
rights in Muslim majority states that codified conservative 
interpretations of Islamic law.  Here, Tunisia’s regional neighbor 
Morocco, which gained independence that same year, offers a 
striking example.213 
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In contrast to Morocco and other Muslim-majority states that 
would later gain independence, Tunisia featured a codification of 
Islamic law that was shockingly progressive at the time, and remains 
arguably the most gender equitable of all Islamic family codes nearly 
sixty years later.214  However, this progressive character was not due 
to a well-organized women’s rights movement or outspoken feminist 
activists.  Rather, the drafting and implementation of this progressive 
Code was due largely to President Bourguiba, whose vision of 
Tunisia most closely aligned to that of secular Turkey.  Bourguiba’s 
mark on Tunisian women’s rights is as unmistakable as it is 
auspicious, as he declared himself both “‘father’ of independent 
Tunisia” and “‘father’ of Tunisian women’s liberation.”215  Finally, 
the fact that “Liberator of Women” is one of only three epitaphs 
found on the door to Bouguiba’s mausoleum demonstrates how 
serious an issue he considered women’s rights to be.216 
While Bourguiba deserves praise for ensuring a progressive 
codification of Islamic family law that benefitted women and 
strengthened women’s rights, it remains highly problematic that he 
did so almost unilaterally, with women playing little role within this 
process.  As Gilman notes, a male interpretation of women’s rights 
and imposition of a progressive legal code onto a decidedly 
conservative population resulted in something of an irony: “Tunisian 
women played no role in the promulgation of the family law 
legislation that ultimately propelled them, rather ironically, into the 
spotlight as symbols of the ‘emancipated’ Arab woman.”217 
Bourguiba’s near unilateral imposition of the Personal Status Code 
provided women a critical opening to professional life and increased 
autonomy.  Nonetheless, this Code outpaced social and religious 
mores, and calls for more conservative interpretations of Islamic law 
soon began to surface, including from younger Tunisians and even 
women.218  One particularly interesting example occurred in 1975, 
when President Bourguiba and his guests gathered for a scholarly 
lecture during Ramadan.219  Bourguiba had made this lecture a 
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tradition since his ascension to power in 1956, but this was the first 
time that he appointed a female scholar to give it.220  Instead of 
praising Bourguiba and the progressive Personal Status Code, 
renowned philosophy professor Hind Shalabi criticized key 
provisions of the Code and called for a return “to the fundamental 
foundations of [Islam].”221  Although this criticism outraged 
Bourguiba, he quickly learned that this sentiment was prevalent 
throughout Tunisia’s universities and the country’s youth.222  Thus, 
Adel al-Toraifi notes that “[w]ith considerable bitterness, Habib 
Bourguiba felt that what he had achieved through education, and 
through the promotion of Western systems and laws, was vanishing 
amidst what he deemed to be a ‘reactionary’ discourse.”223 
Bourguiba’s labeling of this discourse as “reactionary” is 
particularly interesting, since conservative critics could argue that his 
Personal Status Code was equally reactionary, albeit with a 
progressive aim that “reacted” against traditional Islamic values by 
displacing the mosque and religious leaders with state courts, 
secularly trained judges, and bureaucratic officials.224  Indeed, the 
codification of Islamic family law that Bourguiba oversaw was nearly 
as progressive as Shalabi’s call for a return to fundamental Islamic 
values was conservative.225  Between these two disparate positions, 
independent women’s rights organizations struggled to find a middle 
path.226  Furthermore, throughout the 1970s, the government’s 
growing intolerance of dissent made finding this middle ground even 
more difficult, and state influence, if not outright control, of many 
aspects of civil society increased, resulting in what was deemed a 
“monolithic state feminism.”227  And while Tunisia officially 
continued as a secular state that hardly tolerated political Islam, 






224. See id. 
225. Compare Gilman, supra note 199, at 97 (describing the Personal Status Code, 
enacted under Bourguiba as “a document that broke with Islamic law,” which 
“radically reform[ed] Muslim family law”), with Al-Toraifi, supra note 217 (noting 
that Hind Shalabi viewed the new family law “as a complete contradiction to Islam” 
and that Tunisia should “return to the fundamental foundations of [Islam]”). 
226. See Segran, supra note 148. 
227. Gilman, supra note 199, at 98. 
312 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 46 
political Islam were taking root and gaining support, especially in 
Tunisia’s underdeveloped south.228 
While women’s rights in Tunisia remained strong, particularly 
compared to its regional neighbors, discouraging trends also 
continued, even if not immediately apparent.  As one scholars notes, 
the 1980s saw a “male-dominated political left and [a] homogenizing, 
authoritarian state” continue to shrink the space for women’s rights 
activists and feminists (whether secular or religious) to pursue their 
own objectives or to challenge existing laws or social norms.229  
Complicating this relationship, Tunisia’s political elite, whether 
progressive or conservative, and including the women’s movement, 
remains geographically concentrated and predominantly urban.230  
Indeed, political elites of all persuasions remain “centered 
exclusively in the capital city of Tunis.”231  This concentration itself 
speaks to the non-inclusive nature of political groups and civil society 
organizations throughout the Bourguiba and Ben Ali governments, 
raising the unsettling possibility that at least within a subset of 
postcolonial states, women’s rights are achieved not through broad 
consensus or grassroots efforts, but through strong centralized 
governments, or even authoritarian regimes. 
B. Women’s Rights During and After the Tunisian Revolution 
As noted above, women’s rights movements and women-led 
activism is not new to the Middle East and North Africa.232  Within 
Tunisia, just as women played an important role in the struggle for 
national independence, they also played a crucial role in the popular 
uprisings that coalesced into the Tunisian Revolution and forced Ben 
Ali to flee the country.233  Indeed, throughout the MENA region, 
women organized, protested, and fought alongside men in the popular 
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uprisings that later became known as the Arab Spring.234  As the 
Arab Spring protests subsided and transitional governments began to 
form, questions arose as to whether women would retain the voice 
and influence exhibited during the protests.235  Further complicating 
this question was the rise of political Islam.  Although there are 
exceptions, and it is important to recall that political Islam has many 
variations within even a single country;236 historically, this school of 
political thought has sought to exclude women from the public sphere 
and to maintain separate roles for men and women, while also 
upholding a patriarchal interpretation of Islam.237 
These questions quickly came to the fore in Tunisia, after Ennahda 
dominated the October 2011 elections for the Constituent Assembly 
by winning 89 of 217 seats.238  Numerous commentators expressed 
strong concerns that, despite Ennahda’s stated commitment to 
upholding women’s rights, the party would act differently once in 
power.239  While Ennahda insisted that it would respect women’s 
rights and the professional gains that women made under the 
Bourguiba and then Ben Ali governments, a vocal Salafist minority 
made no such promises and introduced a deeply conservative 
interpretation of Islam into Tunisia’s public sphere.240  Although this 
deeply conservative perspective was undoubtedly present before the 
revolution, both Bourguiba and Ben Ali refused to allow this 
perspective to enter public debate.241  Without a strong government 
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authority to check these groups, this perspective began to reenter 
public discourse.  Thus, Tunisia’s transition to democratic rule 
offered these conservative, and often undemocratic groups, an 
opportunity to participate in public life that simply was not available 
since independence.242 
While the conservative beliefs of the Salafists certainly were not 
allowed in political debate or public discourse throughout Bourguiba 
and Ben Ali’s rule, neither were more moderate versions of political 
Islam.  Moreover, despite sometimes stark differences in viewpoint 
between Islamist groups, Bourguiba and especially Ben Ali 
effectively treated all Islamist groups as threats to Tunisia’s secular 
state.  Often brutally repressed throughout Tunisia’s postcolonial 
statehood, Islamist activists gained religious and political freedoms 
that far exceeded their rights during Tunisia’s authoritarian past.243  
The expression of these rights included outcomes that conflicted with 
strong secular perspectives on women’s rights.  For example, 
following the revolution, Tunisia witnessed a notable increase in 
women wearing the hijab and niqab, as many women considered this 
decision “a long-awaited ‘freedom’ after decades of religious 
oppression.”244  In contrast, Bourguiba banned wearing the hijab in 
state offices in 1981, and Ben Ali considered the hijab “a sign of 
extremism,” banning it altogether in the 1990s.245  Interestingly, and 
reflective of the many different perspectives on feminism and 
women’s rights within Tunisia, while some secular commentators 
characterized this change as a worrisome development, others 
reporting within Tunisia showed that wearing the hijab simply was 
not “a big issue among locals.”246 
This final section examines women’s rights in Tunisia during and 
especially after the revolution.  Considering the political and social 
context discussed above, it explores how civil society and the 
National Dialogue shaped women’s rights in post-revolutionary 
Tunisia.  It then turns to the legal outcomes that followed to assess 
women’s rights more than six years after the dramatic events that 
plunged Tunisia onto its democratic, but uncertain path. 
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 1.    Contestation and Reaffirmation: Women’s Rights, Political 
Discourse, and Law 
Following the revolution, both civil society organizations and 
National Dialogue participants, and indeed perhaps the National 
Dialogue process itself, contributed to a reaffirmation of robust 
women’s rights in Tunisia.  This reaffirmation actually served to 
strengthen women’s rights, since activists and women’s rights 
defenders needed to secure these rights in an open public discourse 
and contested political process.  Although women’s rights and their 
legal expression ultimately increased after the revolution, they had 
not been subject to public scrutiny and the political process in this 
manner due to the initial top-down imposition of these rights in the 
late 1950s.247  The fact that women’s rights withstood this scrutiny 
and won widespread political support demonstrates a broad social 
acceptance of these rights, even if certain topics remain contentious 
among some social groups.  In essence, the revolutionary process 
subjected women’s rights to an unexpected test, as the authoritarian 
regime that protected these rights and maintained their fixity could no 
longer do so.  Put to this test, civil society organizations and women’s 
rights activists quickly mobilized to protect their rights to ensure that 
they would remain a defining part of Tunisian life following the 
revolution. 
  a.    Citizens and civil society 
During the revolution, women from nearly all segments of Tunisian 
society participated in the protests and contributed to political 
organization and social mobilization efforts that resulted in Ben Ali’s 
ouster.  Long-standing civil society organizations dedicated to 
women’s rights, as well as bloggers, journalists, activists, trade union 
members, students, mothers, and others all participated in these 
protests.248  The diversity of women participating in the protests and 
popular uprisings suggests at least a temporary break in social norms 
and gender expectations, providing for moments of almost complete 
gender equality.  As FIDH observed, “[t]hroughout the Tunisian 
[R]evolution, women and men were equal.”249 
Although it is difficult to overstate the contributions of “ordinary” 
Tunisian people—women and men—toward ensuring the success of 
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the revolution, it is equally important to appreciate the huge sacrifices 
made by independent Tunisian civil society organizations.  Despite 
near constant suppression and attempts of co-option under Bourguiba 
and Ben Ali, these organizations remained vital and active.250  
Indeed, civil society organizations began to mobilize in the first hours 
of the revolution following Mohamed Bouazizi’s protest of self-
immolation on December 17, 2010.251  Ali Bouazizi, Mohamed’s 
cousin and an active member of the political opposition, stated, 
“[t]hat was the beginning, and the Revolution began with that small 
family, which was embraced by civil society.”252  Civil society 
organizations and Tunisian citizens worked together and created a 
popular uprising that was simply too much for Ben Ali’s regime to 
withstand.  Nonetheless, the rapid pace of this uprising and political 
change was astonishing, as Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on January 
14, 2011, less than a month after the revolution began.253 
Shelley Deane refers to this cooperative ethos as a “spirit of 
solidarity,” and argues that this spirit functioned as the “source of the 
Tunisian [R]evolution.”254  Formal political actors also realized the 
importance of this spirit.  As Deane notes, Ennahda sought to 
maintain “the united civil engagement of CSOs” after winning a 
strong plurality in the 2011 elections.255  Likewise, the interim 
government attempted to institutionalize this engagement by creating 
the Higher Authority for the Realization of Revolutionary Objectives, 
Political Reform, and the Democratic Transitions on February 18, 
2011.256  The creation of this body demonstrates just how important 
citizens and civil society were to the revolution, as political leaders 
began reforming Tunisia’s state institutions in this mold of 
engagement.  Additionally, it also illustrates how closely intertwined 
the political and legal spheres are in revolutionary moments, where 
citizens and civil society attempt to reimagine the state and its 
institutions. 
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Transforming highly repressive states, such as Tunisia under Ben 
Ali, into open societies requires a process of reimagination that can 
only occur when there is a reopening of public space.257  As Charles 
Tripp rightly observes, like all revolutions, the Tunisian Revolution is 
best thought of as “an ongoing process of political struggle, ambition, 
and contestation, as different visions for the country take shape.”258  
In these revolutionary moments, it is only through what Tripp calls 
the “re-appropriation of public space” that allows for “a practical 
restatement of republican ideals,” where citizens can come together 
and reclaim state institutions “from the hands of the small elite who 
had made it a vehicle for the domination of the majority.”259 
Despite its best efforts to reimagine and reclaim these institutions, 
the interim government reached an impasse, if not paralysis, after the 
assassination of secular politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed 
Brahmi in 2013.260  Moreover, while civil society activists had 
succeeded in uniting a disparate opposition against the regime, 
economic instability and ideological competition—particularly over 
sensitive topics such as women’s rights—began to hinder 
cooperation.261  The only briefly reopened public space that had 
allowed citizens to begin this process of reclamation began to close.  
Popular protest was again unwelcome, as the government returned to 
tear gas and batons to suppress protestors and check dissent.262  
Legally, as well as symbolically, this closing was most evident in the 
unfinished drafting of the constitution.  The incomplete constitution 
loomed over women’s rights, as despite recent victories, including 
the preservation of the Personal Status Code and the drafting and 
enactment of a progressive electoral law, constitutional questions 
regarding shari‘a and women’s role in society supplanted these gains 
and again stirred deep concerns among feminists and women’s rights 
activists. 
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 b.    The national dialogue 
The success of the Quartet’s National Dialogue, including its award 
of the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize, is well-known.263  Established in the 
summer of 2013 through tedious, tense, and sometimes exasperating 
negotiations, the Quartet prodded Tunisia’s political parties toward 
compromise and eventually succeeded in allowing for the drafting 
and adoption of Tunisia’s landmark constitution in 2014.264  This 
slow and at times unsteady process again demonstrates the 
uncertainty of legal rights after a revolutionary moment.  Moreover, 
women’s rights seemed especially vulnerable at times, particularly in 
the darkest moments of this period when the country appeared headed 
toward war.  Nonetheless, the Quartet was determined that the 
dialogue would succeed, and it ultimately upheld the promise of the 
inclusive constitution that citizens and civil society called for at the 
beginning of the revolution.265 
Despite the political nature of the National Dialogue, it is important 
to recall that this process was designed to facilitate a legal outcome, 
namely a new constitution.  Moreover, of the four organizations 
comprising the Quartet, two of these organizations, the Tunisian 
Human Rights League (La Ligue Tunisienne pour la Défense des 
Droits de l’Homme) (LTDH) and the Tunisian Bar Association 
(L’Ordre National des Avocats de Tunisie), are legal organizations.266  
When accepting the award, Tunisian Bar Association President 
Mohammed Fadhel Mafoudh stressed the need for dialogue and 
peaceful resolution of conflict.267  Similarly, political commentator 
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Khaled el-Dakheel concluded that “[i]t was neither ideology nor 
gunpowder that allowed [Tunisia] to survive but rather politics and 
dialogue . . . .”268 
When explaining its decision, the Nobel Committee stated that the 
Quartet made a “decisive contribution to the building of a pluralistic 
democracy” following the revolution.269  Furthermore, it found that 
the National Dialogue “show[ed] that Islamist and secular political 
movements can work together to achieve significant results in the 
country’s best interests,” and that “the transition in Tunisia shows 
that civil society institutions and organizations can play a crucial role 
in a country’s democratization.”270  This last point is worth 
reiterating, as despite the involvement of the country’s highest 
political leaders, it was ultimately a group of four civil society 
organizations that played the biggest role in the country’s successful 
democratic transition.  More broadly, this intensely political process, 
which carried the ultimate aim of facilitating the passage of the 
country’s constitution, further emphasizes just how closely related 
politics and law are in revolutionary moments.  Indeed, the border 
between politics and law is typically very porous during these 
moments, and while citizens and civil society are certainly not 
infallible—and in some cases can even hinder democratic 
transformation271—when working together, they can bridge this gap 
and resolve what first seem to be irreconcilable differences. 
  3.    Legal Outcomes 
Despite the concerns that many commentators raised, women’s 
rights were not only maintained, but ultimately expanded following 
the revolution.272  This expansion of rights is evident throughout 
Tunisia’s post-revolution legal system.  Within this system, four legal 
acts provide the greatest contribution to this result: (1) preserving the 
progressive Personal Status Code; (2) drafting and implementing a 
groundbreaking electoral law; (3) a post-revolution constitution 
enshrining gender equality; and (4) the government’s decision to 
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withdraw its reservations to CEDAW.273  This section examines each 
of these outcomes. 
 a.    Preserving the Personal Status Code 
As discussed above, Tunisia’s Personal Status Code (PSC), which 
addresses family law, children’s rights, and inheritance, among other 
legal areas, provides the strongest legal statement of women’s rights 
in any Arab or Muslim-majority state.  And, as Suad Joseph notes, 
family law codes remain “a benchmark of the feminist struggle” in 
the Arab and Muslim-majority world.274  Accordingly, the 
importance of this code to women’s rights leaders and activists, both 
in Tunisia and throughout the MENA region, is difficult to 
understate. 
The symbolic importance of this code, as well as the substantive 
rights that it provides, helps to explain why Tunisian feminists, 
secular and Islamist, voiced serious concerns over possible alterations 
after Ennahda won the majority of parliamentary seats in the 2011 
election.275  Historically, Ennahda had opposed expanding women’s 
rights when it viewed these legal acts as inconsistent with Islamic 
legal principles.276  Thus, Ennahda strongly criticized President 
Bourguiba’s strengthening of the PSC in 1985, which provided 
Tunisian women additional legal rights and demanded a public 
referendum on this matter.277  However, the party changed course, 
and by 1990, it had accepted the PSC.278  More recently, Ennahda 
had openly supported the Code and pledged that it would not seek to 
change it.279  As Alexander notes, Ennahda has repeatedly shown its 
support for women’s rights by stating its respect for the PSC, 
supporting expanded opportunities for women, eliminating workplace 
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harassment, and calling for women to decide whether they want to 
wear the veil (hijab).280 
While feminists’ long-standing mistrust of Ennahda’s position 
toward women’s rights did not always reflect the party’s evolving 
views, the feeling that Ennahda would reverse course and seek to 
undo these legal rights proved difficult for the party to overcome.281  
Many foreign commentators echoed these concerns.282  Further, while 
most foreign commentators offered reasonable perspectives on the 
need for Ennahda to preserve the strong legal rights found within this 
Code, some commentators made unhelpful ideological arguments that 
dismissed Ennahda before it even began to govern.283  Because of this 
combination of domestic and international attention, safeguarding the 
progressive nature of the PSC became a key priority of feminists 
within the MENA region and from further afield. 
Ultimately, this concern proved to be something of a moot point, as 
Ennahda did not attempt to alter the PSC during its governance of 
Tunisia.  Whether the party did not attempt to alter the Code due to 
domestic political opposition or a longer-term strategy of social and 
political change remains debatable.  Regardless, more than six years 
after the revolution, Ennahda does not seem to have much, if any, 
desire to alter the PSC.  Indeed, like Tunisia’s other major political 
parties, Ennahda has focused on economic and security issues, rather 
than broader social and cultural points, as Tunisia’s poor economic 
performance and growing security threats now dominate political 
debate.284 
While the preservation of the Personal Status Code was a crucial 
outcome for upholding women’s rights in Tunisia, it is important to 
remember that the Code is imperfect.285  Inheritance remains the most 
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glaring legal inequality between women and men within the Code, as 
women still generally receive half the inheritance that men receive.286  
In addition, restrictions on women’s rights after divorce and 
remarriage are also problematic.  For example, Article 58 prohibits a 
mother from allowing her children to live with her after she 
remarries, even though this same prohibition does not apply to 
fathers.287  Thus, even though the PSC remains an undisputedly 
important contribution to advancing women’s rights in the MENA 
region, even this landmark Code contains provisions that frustrate full 
gender equality. 
 b.    Electoral law 
While debate over the PSC centered on maintaining women’s 
rights, the 2011 electoral law established new women’s rights with 
the intent of making the Tunisian government more gender 
representative.288  This law “established full parity and compulsory 
alternation of male and female candidates” for the October 2011 
Constituent Assembly elections.289  In essence, this “extremely 
progressive” law required political parties “to make women at least 
half of their candidates.”290 
Unfortunately, the gender inclusive intent of this law and its 
importance to women’s rights was undermined by the overwhelming 
tendency of political parties to list male candidates first on electoral 
lists.  Indeed, political parties listed male candidates first 94 percent 
of the time.291  Despite this undermining tactic, female candidates 
still performed well and won a significant number of seats within the 
assembly.  In total, women won 59 of 271 seats, 27.2 percent of the 
National Constituent Assembly.292  In comparison, women hold 19.5 
percent of the seats in the U.S. House of Representatives and 20.0 
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percent of seats in the U.S. Senate, making up 19.6 percent of the 
entire U.S. Congress293 
 c.    The post-revolution constitution 
Writing a new constitution quickly became a shared goal of many 
political actors and activists after President Ben Ali fled the country 
and resigned from office on January 14, 2011.294  After some initial 
turmoil, on March 3, 2011 the interim government announced that an 
election for the Constituent Assembly would take place on October 
23, 2011.295  Ennahda won the majority of seats and formed a 
comfortable plurality with the Congress for the Republic and 
Ettakatol parties, claiming 139 of 217 seats.296  The assembly’s 
responsibilities included creating a new constitution for post-
revolution Tunisia.  Following the Constituent Assembly elections, 
Ennahda leader Rachid Ghannouchi stated that the party would honor 
its commitment to produce a new constitution within one year.297 
From the outset of these elections, the assembly’s efforts to draft a 
constitution and transition Tunisia into a democratic state received 
significant attention both in the MENA region and more broadly.298  
Of course, drafting and adopting this constitution took much longer 
than the expected one year, as political crisis engulfed the country 
between July and December 2013.299  Only after the timely 
intervention by the National Quartet and an additional fifteen months 
of negotiation did the country finally adopt a new constitution on 
January 26, 2014.  Despite the dark moments where Tunisia appeared 
closer to chaos and civil war than security and a democratic 
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transition, the adoption of the constitution signaled to many that 
compromise prevailed over division.300 
Indeed, political compromise, particularly by Ennahda, became the 
focal point of the praise that Tunisia’s political class received after 
the adoption of the constitution.  For example, Daoud found that 
Ghannouchi yielded to political pressure and “in the name of the 
national interest embraced a policy of dialogue.”301  Likewise, 
Ennahda leadership also recognized that drafting and adopting a new 
constitution served a crucial need for the party’s long-term 
objectives.302  Thus, Netterstrøm notes that while Ennahda sought to 
leave “as large and deep an Islamist imprint” on the new constitution 
as possible, compromise was always its first priority.303 
Although commentators generally praised Ennahda for its 
compromise over the constitution, questions of motive and hidden 
agendas also surfaced.304  These questions arose in large part over the 
party’s acceptance of secular legal values over Islamic legal and 
social norms within the constitution.  Ennahda showed a pragmatic 
attitude by accepting these preferences, but it also needed to assuage 
its core supporters that the party was not compromising its Islamist 
identity.  To do so, it offered Islamic legal interpretations that 
supported the concessions the party made during the constitutional 
drafting process.305  Thus, Netterstrøm concludes that, for Ennahda, 
“political calculation not only trumps religious doctrine, but 
determines the very interpretation of religion itself.”306  In contrast, 
Marks argues that Ennahda’s greatest constitutional concern did not 
pertain to religious values, but to the structure of the government.307  
Given the oppression that the party endured under Tunisia’s two 
strongman presidents, Ennahda most opposed a strong presidential 
model of governance, fearing that this model could devolve into 
authoritarianism.308  According to Marks, the party ceded more 
ground on this point than any other issue.309 
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Despite the long and complex negotiations this constitutional 
drafting process required, the result was one of nearly unequivocal 
praise.  As writer and cultural critic Shajahan Madampat states: Of all 
the Arab countries, “Tunisia has arguably the most progressive, most 
secular and least misogynistic constitution, approved near-
consensually last year.”310  Likewise, Marks notes that Tunisia’s 
2014 Constitution was “the first constitution freely created by a 
representative, democratically elected assembly anywhere in the 
Arabic-speaking world.”311  Still, other commentators caution against 
overemphasizing the importance of the constitution at the expense of 
overshadowing other key reforms.  For example, Nadia Marzouki 
remarks that “[t]he collective fixation on the constitution and the 
subsequent elections had a downside . . . [since] [i]t sidelined three 
subjects—the renewal of the political field, legislative reform and 
transitional justice—that were just as important to the transition.”312 
From a women’s rights perspective, the most important legal 
outcomes in the new constitution are the decisions not to include a 
reference to shari‘a and to include an article that establishes the 
state’s role in protecting and strengthening women’s rights, while 
also recognizing gender equality.  The debate over including a shari‘a 
clause—even a symbolic reference—became protracted and at times 
contentious, both between secular and Islamist actors and within 
Ennahda, by far the country’s most significant Islamist party.313  
Ultimately, Ennahda relented on this point, but justified its decision 
to do so on Islamic legal principles and not political calculations.314  
The inclusion of gender equality, as opposed to the more familiar 
concept of gender complementarity found within many other 
constitutions in Arab and Muslim-majority states, was a key point for 
feminists.  Ennahda also figured prominently in this debate, first 
creating a firestorm of criticism for its initial mishandling of this 
issue before quickly retracting this position and supporting full 
gender equality. 
  i.    Shari‘a 
Secular political parties quickly rejected including a reference to 
shari‘a within the constitution, but Ennahda engaged in a protracted 
internal debate over the importance of including a clause or article 
 
310. Madampat, supra note 184. 
311. Marks II, supra note 68, at 3. 
312. Marzouki, supra note 54. 
313. Id. 
314. Marks II, supra note 68, at 22. 
326 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 46 
referencing shari‘a.315  Some secular politicians, such as Mohsen 
Marzouk of the Nidaa Tounes party, rejected these deliberations as 
unnecessary, arguing that the 1959 Constitution’s omission of shari‘a 
was “perfectly fine,” and that this debate was simply a strategic tactic 
to gain time.316  Likewise, some academic commentators exhorted 
“emerging democracies,” such as Tunisia, to frame their “new 
national identities” on “unqualified grants of religious freedoms as 
well as specifically enumerated human rights consistent with 
international law.”317 
Although well-intentioned, such calls ignore Tunisia’s pluralist past 
and that the denial of religious freedoms and human rights stemmed 
not from Islamist groups or an inadequate constitution, but almost 
entirely from Tunisia’s authoritarian secular governments.  Indeed, 
statements such as, “[c]hanging the text of a constitution will not 
immediately change a culture, but it can guide it in future generations 
as legislatures and courts look to their founding documents in 
interpreting the laws,” read at best as naïve, as this statement 
minimizes the responsibility of previous governments for past 
injustices and overlooks the country’s rich legal tradition.318  
Furthermore, it is debatable what legal effect, if any, a nonbinding 
reference to shari‘a would have had on the constitution, particularly 
since Ennahda identified with a tolerant and progressive version of 
shari‘a.319  As Marks notes, Ennahda leader Rachid Ghannouchi 
rejected rigid legal codes and argued for a progressive interpretation 
of shari‘a that focused “on more expansive notions of Islamic ethics, 
including social justice, equality between persons, and the like.”320 
Ennahda eventually relented on “the sharia question,” although the 
more conservative party members have expressed concerns that this 
concession goes too far.321  Nonetheless, Tunisia’s post-revolutionary 
constitution defines Tunisia as a civil state, and while it references 
the teachings of Islam, it does not reference shari‘a.322  Even more 
surprisingly, “the constitution grants the right to ‘freedom of 
conscience and belief,’” the latter, according to one scholar, 
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represents a “truly revolutionary” legal principle within the Arab 
world.323 
  ii.    Gender equality 
Like the inclusion of an article or clause referencing shari‘a, the 
issue of gender created a rift between Ennahda and secular political 
parties.  Article 22 of the first draft of the constitution affirmed the 
equality of all citizens, but Article 28 provided for complementarity 
between men and women.324  Critics seized on this point to argue that 
Ennahda intended to undermine women’s rights, just as they had 
warned.325  A “firestorm of criticism” ensued, which was exacerbated 
by uncritical reporting by foreign journalists who understood Article 
28 to mean that women served as “men’s complements,” whereas the 
article actually stated that “[men and women’s] roles complement 
one another within the family.”326 
Ennahda quickly retracted this article, and likely did not intend to 
produce the gender inequality that this clause could have caused, but 
as Marks notes, this gaffe occurred at a terrible time and resulted in a 
missed opportunity for Ennahda to build trust on a crucial issue.327  
As she states: “Many of Ennahda’s fiercest opponents—already 
fearful that the party would scale back critical pieces of women’s 
rights legislation—felt they had seen the party’s true colors, and 
vowed to fight even harder against Ennahda.”328  The controversy 
that this article created was hardly the only contentious issue to the 
first draft of Tunisia’s post-revolution constitution, which the drafters 
released in Arabic on August 8, 2012.329  Nonetheless, it proved to be 
a persistent obstacle to the drafters and was only resolved through 
several subsequent revisions. 
In contrast, Tunisia’s post-revolution constitution, finally adopted 
on January 26, 2014, provided strong protections for women’s rights 
and a guarantee of gender equality.330  Article 46, which details these 
protections, contains the following four provisions: 
1. The state commits to protect women’s accrued rights 
and work to strengthen and develop those rights. 
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2. The state guarantees the equality of opportunities 
between women and men to have access to all levels of 
responsibility in all domains. 
3. The state works to attain parity between women and 
men in elected Assemblies. 
4. The state shall take all necessary measures in order to 
eradicate violence against women.331 
Human Rights Watch was one of several prominent human rights 
organizations to praise the constitution’s inclusion of strong women’s 
rights, stating: “[The constitution] makes Tunisia one of the few 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa region with a 
constitutional obligation to work toward gender parity in elected 
assemblies.”332  Likewise, Marks notes that the constitution’s 
inclusion of gender parity was a “first . . . in the Arab world.”333 
Although many commentators expressed surprise that Ennahda 
would agree to such a strong statement of women’s rights within the 
constitution, the party’s previous actions suggested that it would be 
amenable to this outcome.  For example, in 2005, Ennahda “agreed to 
a joint platform of demands” that included its commitment to 
“multiparty democracy and to the progressive rights that Tunisian 
women by then enjoyed.”334  Furthermore, women historically have 
played an active role in Ennahda.335  Despite these commitments to 
supporting women’s rights, Ennahda has never fully convinced 
Tunisian women that it does not harbor ulterior motives, and as 
Alexander notes, “[n]o single constituency has expressed greater 
concern about Ennahda’s rise than Tunisian women.”336  Moreover, 
while the party takes pains to profess its public support of women’s 
rights, it also continues to undercut these statements through, at best, 
carelessness and insensitivity and, at worst, slippages of a duplicitous 
agenda.  For example, following the revolution, Ennahda continued 
to stress its commitment to maintaining the rights of women, but in 
2011 and 2012, high-ranking party officials made several statements 
that raised questions over the sincerity of this commitment.337 
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Until Ennahda refrains from these lapses of trust, it will not 
convince Tunisian women of its genuine commitment toward 
establishing and maintaining women’s rights.  Still, despite 
predictions of obstruction or worse, Ennahda supported the new 
constitution even though it enshrined many principles that the party 
had previously opposed.338  Accordingly, Ennahda has rebuked its 
critics, at least for the time being. 
 d.    Withdrawing reservations to CEDAW 
Throughout the MENA region, women’s rights activists recognize 
CEDAW as a critical tool for pressuring governments to advance 
women’s rights.339  Indeed, this landmark treaty defines what 
constitutes discrimination against women and establishes minimum 
steps that countries must take to end such discrimination.  Although 
many MENA and Muslim majority countries have signed CEDAW, 
they typically did so while making significant reservations and 
declarations to offset treaty provisions perceived to conflict with 
Islamic law, thereby undermining the intent of the treaty.340  Tunisia 
offers a case in point.  Under President Bourguiba, Tunisia ratified 
CEDAW on September 20, 1985, but also made a declaration to 
Article 15(4) and reservations to Articles 9(2), 16(c), (d), (f), (g), (h), 
and 29(1).341 
Feminists and women’s rights organizations fought to remove the 
declarations and reservations that Bourguiba made and advocated for 
better implementation of CEDAW during Bourguiba’s rule and Ben 
Ali’s subsequent reign.  Given the repressive political atmosphere 
and constraints on civil society, these efforts often ended in 
frustration and impasse.  The Tunisian Revolution injected these 
efforts with new hope, as the stunning speed of political change 
suggested that a window for meaningful progressive change had 
opened.  To capitalize on this opportunity, women’s rights activists 
and feminists from across the region met in Morocco in May 2011 to 
find the best strategy for achieving full implementation of CEDAW, 
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particularly as several countries began political transitions following 
the Arab Spring.342 
A few months after this important meeting, the Tunisian Council of 
Ministers adopted a draft decree to lift the country’s CEDAW 
reservations on August 16, 2011.343  The transitional government 
adopted this decree into law on October 24, 2011, publishing Decree-
Law 103 in the country’s official legal journal.344  However, the 
newly elected government did not send the withdrawal notification to 
the U.N. Secretary-General, who acts as the depository of the 
convention.345  Under international law, this lack of notification 
meant that this Act had no legal effect at the international level, and 
the declaration and reservations remained in effect.346  It was not until 
April 17, 2014—more than two and a half years later—that Tunisia 
officially withdrew its reservations to the CEDAW, thereby binding 
itself to making the legal changes necessary to support this 
decision.347  Again, women’s rights organizations and civil society 
helped to secure this outcome through persistent campaigning and 
advocacy efforts.348 
The Tunisian reservations to CEDAW had primarily concerned 
gender equality issues in family matters.  Lifting these reservations 
provided women stronger rights inside and outside the family, 
including (1) confirming a woman’s ability to pass her nationality 
onto her children; (2) clarifying rights and responsibilities in 
marriage and divorce, as well as matters relating to children and 
guardianship; (3) demarcating personal rights for husbands and wives 
with regard to family name and occupation; and (4) affirming the 
same rights applied to both husband and wife in ownership of 
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property.349  Numerous human rights organizations noted the 
importance of withdrawing these reservations.  For example, Human 
Rights Watch called this Act “an important step toward realizing 
gender equality.”350  Likewise, women’s rights researcher Rothna 
Begum stated: “The Tunisian government, by lifting major 
reservations to CEDAW, is proclaiming its commitment to advance 
women’s rights.”351 
Although human rights organizations rightfully noted the 
importance of this decision, they also urged Tunisia to do more than 
simply drop its CEDAW reservations.352  Without meaningful 
implementation, this decision will have little practical effect for 
advancing women’s rights.  Likewise, Tunisia remains one of the 
relatively few African Union member states that has not signed the 
protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa, commonly referred to as the Maputo 
Protocol.353  This important legislation provides additional rights to 
CEDAW and helps to counter longstanding critiques of human rights 
as an inherently “Western” project.354 
Academic debate over whether human rights are “Western” or 
“universal” are both relentlessly cyclical and of little substantive 
value to those most in need of stronger human rights.  In addition, 
debates over human rights treaties such as CEDAW often do not 
resonate with Muslim women.  As Islamic feminist and human rights 
activist Zainah Anwar notes, a human rights framework will not have 
meaningful significance to many Muslim women, especially within 
rural areas, such as the villages within Anwar’s native Malaysia.355  
Instead, Islamic law and religious matters matter most to women.  
Thus, she concludes: 
Invoking CEDAW is not enough to convince these women 
of their rights, because it has no resonance to them.  Islam, 
on the other hand, is a source of values and principles.  We 
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needed to engage with religion and provide answers to these 
questions in ways that were relevant to their lives.356 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Arab Spring uprisings remind us that revolutions are periods of 
immense uncertainty, providing moments of great hope as well as 
moments of great despair.  The outcomes that followed the Arab 
Spring also remind us that positive change is not inevitable and that 
authoritarian leaders often reassert themselves rather than give way to 
democratic change.  Revolutions can lead to peaceful transitions and 
an inclusive reimagining of the state and its institutions—effectively 
a reordering of society—or they can result in terrible violence and 
protracted conflict and instability.357  While the Arab Spring 
produced outcomes on both ends of this spectrum, the mostly 
discouraging results offer a blunt reminder that not all popular 
uprisings will succeed and that authoritarian rule seldom goes away 
quietly. 
Although the Tunisian Revolution ultimately produced a 
democratic government based on the rule of law and a progressive 
constitution, this result was anything but certain.  Indeed, such an 
outcome seemed all but impossible during the darkest days of the 
transition when the country teetered on the brink of armed conflict 
and political collapse.358  Women’s rights followed a similar 
trajectory and reached a similar result, as feminists and women’s 
rights activists eventually succeeded in not only maintaining, but also 
strengthening women’s rights in post-revolution Tunisia.  Likewise, 
this outcome was not assured and required the persistence and 
commitment of numerous individuals and organizations to secure 
these advances. 
To achieve this outcome, women’s rights leaders drew on the 
progressive legal history of Tunisia, while also deftly negotiating the 
tension that came from previously suppressed conservative Islamist 
groups.  Feminists and women’s rights activists suddenly found 
themselves defending Tunisia’s progressive women’s rights in 
political debate and public discourse without the backing of an 
authoritarian government that simply denied this challenging, and at 
times, even confrontational perspective.359  That women’s rights 
advocates succeeded in maintaining the progressive Personal Status 
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Code, passing a groundbreaking electoral law, including gender 
equality within the constitution, and overseeing the government 
withdraw its declaration and reservations to CEDAW shows the 
broad acceptance of strong women’s rights within Tunisia. 
Whether Tunisia’s approach to expanding women’s rights could 
succeed in other Islamic or Muslim-majority states remains a 
contested debate.  However, Tunisian exceptionalism suggests that 
this approach is not easily repeatable.  Indeed, the strong legal 
protections and progressive legal system that Tunisian women have 
enjoyed for decades as well as the political dominance of an Islamist 
party as progressive and as willing to compromise as Ennahda make 
this approach difficult to replicate.360  Thus, Tunisia is an outlier both 
to the rest of the Arab Spring uprisings and to women’s rights in the 
MENA region.361  While Tunisia represents a successful outcome and 
perhaps a motivating example for women’s rights activists to 
consider, these actors should ground their efforts for legal and 
political reform in their histories and cultures.  In this sense, Tunisian 
women’s rights should serve more as an approach than as a blueprint 
in the struggle for advancing women’s rights and achieving gender 
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